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A word of introduction 
from Dean Antoon vandevelde
Dear alumni,
Every year, as spring slowly turns into summer, 
we bring you the Newsletter of  the Alumni 
Association. The name of  our periodical may 
not be very romantic, and few of  you are 
probably still professionally involved with phi-
losophy, but I dare say that this occasion makes 
many of  you fondly remember your time at 
the Institute of  Philosophy. “It was one long 
holiday,” said someone to me last year, some-
one who graduated a long time ago. She did 
not mean that the study of  philosophy was too 
easy, but rather that it is a luxury to be able 
to study philosophy for four uninterrupted 
years. By now, chances are high that many of  
you will not be able to recognise most of  the 
people here, if  you’re ever passing by at the 
Institute. This year, we had the emeritus cel-
ebration of  retired colleagues Ignace Verhack, 
Jaap van Brakel, Paul Cruysberghs and Carlos 
Steel. There is a article about each of  them in 
this issue of  the Newsletter. Prof. André Van 
de Putte and Prof. Herman Dijn have left the 
Institute for some time now. At the end of  this 
academic year, Professors Rudolf  Bernet and 
Arnold Burms will depart as well, and so will 
Professor Martin Moors next year and Prof. 
André Cloots the year after. Last year, Prof. 
Rob Devos requested a special retirement and 
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he limited his teaching activities to just two 
philosophical courses. Younger philosophers 
have been appointed to replace our former 
Professors. Helder De Schutter, Nicolas de 
Warren, Pieter d’Hoine, Jan Opsomer, Andrea 
Robiglio, Stefan Rummens, Stéphane Symons 
and Karin de Boer are some of  our new names. 
Yes, you have read it correctly. There is once 
again a female professor in our corps, a little 
more than two years after the unfortunate death 
of  Patricia De Martelaere. In this Newsletter, 
you will also read an interview with some of  
the newcomers.
This year, Prof. Jerrold Levinson held the 
International Francqui Chair. He gave a series 
of  lectures on philosophical aesthetics and in 
May 2011, he participated in a conference on 
Theories of  Beauty. Prof. Jonathan Lear gave 
a remarkable lecture in the context of  the 
Mercier Chair. Visiting Professors for the yearly 
Thomas Lecture and Mercier Chair were Prof. 
Moshe Halbertal and Prof. Christoph Schmidt, 
both from the Hebrew University. In addition 
to these prestigious lectures, a steady stream of  
well-known foreign visitors have come to the 
Institute, all of  them provided a lecture, a semi-
nar or a conference paper. You can follow these 
events in our weekly electronic Newsletter. 
In particular, I want to mention the Feast 
of  Philosophy. This Feast was organised for 
the second time, in April, the Month of  
Philosophy. Indeed, the intention is to show 
that philosophy is a celebration. Or, more 
modestly speaking, we want to encourage an 
interest in philosophy for a wider audience. 
In the Netherlands, Philosophy Magazine suc-
ceeds in this initiative. During the Month of  
Philosophy, dozens of  events are organised 
in almost all major Dutch cities. In Belgium, 
we do not equal their success. In comparison 
to the Netherlands, Belgian so-called quality 
newspapers spend very little attention to new 
philosophical publications. In Germany, Die Zeit 
published an annex in January in which public 
intellectuals explained the exciting aspects of  
philosophy. In Flanders, we can only dream 
of  this kind of  attention. And yet, despite our 
relative invisibility, we cannot complain about 
a lack of  interest in philosophy as such. In our 
universities, many more people begin a study in 
philosophy and we have fewer drop-outs than 
in the Netherlands. Our day and evening pro-
grammes remain attractive to young and old. 
Furthermore, the second edition of  the Feast 
of  Philosophy was a great success. It was a 
beautiful sunny day and yet three hundred peo-
ple showed up on the premises of  STUK, our 
partner organisation. The Real Life was the theme 
of  the event. The Keynote speaker was Susan 
Neiman, who is known for her book on moral 
clarity. She talked about one of  the questions 
that Prof. Steel had already discussed in his 
farewell speech: Would we re-live our lives in 
exactly the same way if  we had the chance to do 
so? And just like Prof. Steel, Neiman appealed 
to Nietzsche and his doctrine of  the eternal 
return. At the Feast, there was also an interview 
with the Dutch writer Frank Westerman about 
the representation of  actual life in literary non-
fiction. 
Above all, the day was dominated by discus-
sions on the conception of  philosophy as a 
way of  life. The French classicist Pierre Hadot 
once stated that ancient Greek thinkers never 
had the intention of  developing a systematic 
philosophy, but rather promoted a philosophi-
cal way of  life. For Michel Foucault, these writ-
ings were the ideal inspiration for his last book, 
which is about caring for oneself, “Le souci de 
soi”. This theme was later popularised in the 
abundant literature on happiness. In book-
stores, cooking books for happiness are often 
stacked in large piles, all of  them illustrated 
with photos, containing nothing more than 
short articles by many different authors, often 
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with a little summary at the end and a recipe 
for luck. “Ego-literature inflated,” according 
to Paul van Tongeren. Joep Dohmen (former 
student of  the Institute and endorsed by Paul 
van Tongeren), in contrast, pointed out to the 
audience that his views are more subtle than his 
opponent previously suggested. 
“Our readers love philosophy” the editor of  
a women’s magazine once confided to me after 
an interview. “But is that really philosophy?” 
whispers the academic carefully. There are 
no uninteresting questions in philosophy, but 
not everyone has the same talent to deal with 
such questions. For example, let’s have a look 
at the demand for happiness. The Hungarian 
psychologist with the unpronounceable name 
Csikszentmihalyi argues that happiness is con-
nected to the ability to enjoy ‘flow’ experiences. 
In the ‘flow’, one would be fully absorbed by 
becoming the activity itself  so that one would 
completely forget time and place. This state-
ment may be questionable. For a philosopher, 
however, it is still something intriguing. Husserl 
and phenomenology have taught us that all 
consciousness intentionally related to an ob-
ject contains something of  self-consciousness. 
Many early-modern philosophers describe the 
human being as an actor who plays a role but 
who never completely becomes a victim of  this, 
because his mind will always see himself  as an 
actor in a scene. 
Rousseau had no sympathy for this spec-
tacle in which the human being is both actor 
and spectator. He harboured some nostalgia 
for a mythical time when people immediately 
coincided with themselves, but for the Socratic 
philosopher “the unexamined life is not worth 
living.” People are said to be hardly able to leave 
their self-awareness behind. For a  philosopher, 
this is not even desirable. And what about that 
‘flow’ experience – let’s leave it an open ques-
tion whether this really makes us happy – is 
this an illusion, something that has no right to 
exist? Does it matter whether this experience is 
generated by reading a detective novel, by solv-
ing a crossword puzzle, by listening to Bach, 
Purcell and the Rolling Stones, by writing a 
poem or by jogging? And can philosophy (even 
though this question may sound like a curse 
in the church) also lead to flow experiences? 
For example, can you also get it from reading 
interviews with retired professors who have 
recently left us? 
It may be interesting to give it a try. Go for it.
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introduction by 
russell Friedman,
Director of the International Programme 
Dear Alumni:
It’s been both a busy and a good year for 
the HIW and its International Programme. 
Already in August 2010, when I took up the 
directorship from Prof. William Desmond, 
the International Programme was on a sure 
footing. We had enrollment for the 2010-2011 
academic year of  around 30 Bachelor students, 
60 MA students, and 60 MPhil students: this 
is certainly one of  the largest classes ever. We 
also began the year with one of  our long-time 
academic secretaries, Emilia Brodencova, mov-
ing from a temporary to a permanent position 
in the HIW’s International Office; Emilia’s 
new post will give a valuable continuity to the 
Programme. The Programme’s other academic 
secretary, Margherita Tonon, continues her 
part-time work in the International Office, as 
several of  the articles in this issue of  the Leuven 
Philosophy Newsletter demonstrate. Between 
the two of  them, Emilia and Margherita en-
able the International Programme to deal with 
countless issues for students at all levels of  
their Leuven education, from Bachelor to PhD. 
Finally, this Newsletter, bringing you reports 
of  many of  the events that took place here in 
Leuven over the past academic year, is edited 
by the HIW’s Administrative Director, Ines 
Van Houtte, who took up the editorship from 
Renée Köhler-Ryan, after Renée received her 
PhD three years ago. (This June, Renée and 
her family move to Australia, where she takes 
up a position at the University of  Notre Dame 
in Sydney).
These changes in the International 
Programme are mirrored in the composition 
of  the rest of  the HIW staff, which is chang-
ing quite rapidly in these years. Indeed, a whole 
generation of  professors who have meant an 
enormous amount to the HIW are now retir-
ing. In this connection, in this issue of  the 
Leuven Philosophy Newsletter, you will find 
interviews, laudations, and talks of  several of  
our recent emeriti: Paul Cruysberghs, Carlos 
Steel, Jaap van Brakel, and Ignace Verhack. 
Despite the general economic situation of  the 
last years, we are pleased that the HIW has 
been able to appoint several new professors, 
and you’ll find below interviews with the most 
recent of  them: Andrea Robiglio, Jan Opsomer, 
and Pieter d’Hoine.
The year hasn’t only been taken up by 
personnel changes, it’s also been full to the 
brim with ceremonies, lectures, and events. 
The ceremonies are represented in this issue 
of  the Newsletter by speeches delivered by 
William Desmond and Jonathan Sozek at 
last year’s Graduation, as well as a description 
of  the doctoral dissertations defended in the 
academic year 2009-2010. Moreover, the HIW 
has hosted literally dozens of  conferences, 
seminars, workshops, and lectures on topics 
ranging from ancient philosophy, ethics, and 
social theory to contemporary phenomenology 
and analytic philosophy. There are, of  course, 
our regular Thursday Lectures, organized by 
the International Programme; upon his retire-
ment, Jaap van Brakel gave a valedictory lecture 
as part of  the Thursday Lecture series, and that 
text is published below. Also in this issue of  
the Newsletter is an interview with last year’s 
Mercier Chair holder, Prof. Jonathan Lear 
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(University of  Chicago). The Mercier Chair 
Lecture, like the Husserl Memorial Lecture and 
the Thomas Lecture, takes place basically every 
year at the HIW , usually in the spring. An 
unusual gift to the HIW this past year was the 
presence of  Prof. Jerrold Levinson (University 
of  Maryland, College Park), the recipient of  
a Francqui visiting professorship; Levinson 
worked the entire year in Leuven, teaching and 
participating in many of  the HIW’s activities. 
An interview with him can be found below. 
Descriptions of  some of  the many other events 
that have taken place at the HIW over the last 
year can be found in the “HIW news” section 
of  this issue.
And what about education? For our doc-
toral students, we’ve tried this year to give a 
solid introduction to such issues as publishing, 
searching for a job, and teaching (the latter 
especially, but not exclusively, meant for the 
doctoral students who serve as tutors in HIW 
Bachelor Seminars); see, in this issue of  the 
Newsletter, Margherita Tonon’s report on this 
aspect of  the HIW’s efforts to make graduates 
of  our Doctoral Programme as competitive as 
possible in the world of  professional philoso-
phy. But when I look back at the academic year 
2010-2011, now drawing slowly to a close, one 
trend that I find especially noteworthy is the 
increasing importance that the HIW is placing 
on training our students in presentation and 
communication skills. Thus, a large part of  
our Bachelor Common Seminar was devoted 
to having the students give an oral presentation 
on the basis of  their seminar paper. As part 
of  their Common Seminar, all MPhil students 
were first treated to a workshop, lead by Prof. 
Rudi Visker, dealing with how to craft and to 
present an academic paper; thereafter the stu-
dents were split up into four groups each led 
by one professor (Stefaan Cuypers, Friedman, 
Bart Raymaekers, Visker) in which they gave 
repeated oral presentations under the watchful 
(and critical!) eyes of  their fellow students. As 
far as I can tell, everyone involved in the MPhil 
workshops thought it a real success, and it was 
quite inspiring for me to see just how quickly 
the students made progress in their presenta-
tion skills. We’re hoping next year to begin to 
have a corresponding set of  workshops for our 
MA students, and we intend to continue with 
this sort of  training for both our Bachelor and 
MPhil students as well. No matter what line of  
work our graduates go into, whether academic 
philosophy or something far removed from it, 
the skills required for composing and present-
ing an academic paper – organization of  infor-
mation, argumentative strategy, and “dramatic” 
structure and performance – will be an asset.
This emphasis on effective composition and 
delivery of  oral presentations was perhaps best 
seen this year in our “First Annual Graduate 
Student Conference”, which took place on 
April 1, 2011. Around forty students in the MA, 
MPhil, and PhD Programmes presented each 
a twenty-minute paper dealing (in most cases) 
with their current thesis research. There was 
no general conference theme, but the papers 
were organized into (parallel) sessions, each 
containing several papers on related topics; 
professors and students attended, and ample 
time was allowed for questions and comments. 
A very full day ended with a keynote lecture 
by our invited speaker, Prof. Bence Nanay 
(University of  Antwerp). A significant aspect 
of  this conference was that it was organized 
by students for students. With the exception of  
organizational input by Emilia Brodencova of  
the International Office, the entire event was 
planned by a group of  international students 
– a group who didn’t know each other before 
arriving in Leuven last September! For me, 
what was most special about the conference 
was seeing the student speakers presenting with 
tremendous enthusiasm and conviction the 
fruits of  their research. I think that it is fair 
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to say that in all ways the Graduate Student 
Conference was a real success, and it is a success 
that we plan to repeat next year.
Speaking of  the future, one of  the major 
issues that we would like to address over the 
next few years is the – often remarked upon 
– gap between the HIW’s International and 
Dutch Programmes: the two student groups 
definitely have too little to do with one another 
in both curricular and extracurricular activities. 
We’re already looking for ways to facilitate 
interaction between the international and the 
Flemish students, to open up linguistic, cul-
tural, and educational opportunities to the 
benefit of  all involved.
More generally, the impression that I hope 
that you take away from this year’s Leuven 
Philosophy Newsletter is that the HIW is 
going through an exciting period. We’re proud 
to maintain the elements that have for many 
years made the HIW an attractive place to 
study and to work: the library’s as good as ever, 
the teachers are as dedicated as ever, and the 
philosophical environment as rich as ever. But 
we’re also working hard to ensure that, in a rap-
idly changing world, our students at all levels 
are getting the kinds of  skills and experiences 
that are commensurate with the best possible 
philosophical education and that prepare them 
for a variety of  future careers.
As this Newsletter documents, it’s been 
both a busy and a good year for the HIW and 
its International Programme – and we’re look-
ing forward to 2011-2012.
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in memoriam: 
Fr. David Boileau
The death took place on January 24th, 2011 of  
Fr. David Boileau, a graduate of  the Institute 
of  Philosophy, and a long-time supporter of  
its mission and work.  Born in Kalamazoo, 
Michigan, David Boileau was ordained a Jesuit 
priest in 1956. He received his doctorate from 
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 1961 
for a dissertation entitled, Ethical Principles and 
Discrimination in the United States of America. The 
dissertation reveals his abiding passion for so-
cial justice that continued after he returned to 
America, as did his enthusiastic dedication to 
philosophy and to the Institute.
Fr. Boileau was a man of  many parts. He 
proudly claimed to have French roots, as re-
flected in his name, and also laid claim to Irish 
roots that took him frequently to Ireland.  He 
was perhaps most widely known as a long-
time champion of  workers’ rights and of  trade 
unions in the USA, gaining a reputation for 
himself  as a “worker priest”. From 1985 to 1988 
he led the Human Services Department of  the 
International Brotherhood of  Teamsters, the 
largest and one of  the oldest trade unions in 
the USA. This involvement with the unions 
and workers’ rights sprang from his deep com-
mitment to Catholic social teaching. In 1998 he 
edited a collection of  essays entitled Principles of 
Catholic Social Teaching convinced, as he wrote in 
his introduction, that “There is a constant call, 
occasioned by new situations, which forces us 
to rethink what the dignity of  man will mean 
in our century and in the large organizational 
structures of  our society. The past is prologue 
and dated.” He also collected and translated ten 
essays on the subject by Canon Roger Aubert, 
former director of  the Revue d’histoire ecclésias-
tique, which he published in 2003 as Catholic 
Social Teaching: An Historical Perspective. 
During all this time Fr. Boileau continued 
his involvement in philosophy as a well-loved 
teacher. In 1970 he was appointed professor at 
Loyola University, New Orleans, where he re-
mained until his retirement. He was responsible 
for sending many students from the USA to 
the Institute for graduate study. He also started 
a summer study-abroad programme at Leuven 
for American students, one of  the first of  such 
programmes at Leuven. This enabled him to 
revisit his beloved Leuven regularly, and his old 
teachers, Professors André Wylleman, Urbain 
Dhondt and the late Guillaume Theys. 
Fr. Boileau continued to work on behalf  of  the 
Institute’s own international students, finding 
funds to enable them to go to conferences or to 
visit libraries elsewhere for research purposes. 
He also fostered exchanges between faculty 
at Loyola University and at Leuven, regularly 
facilitating visits by professors from Leuven to 
Loyola, and Loyola to Leuven. Fr. Boileau had 
a wide circle of  benefactors with deep pockets, 
and their generosity to him he passed on by 
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aiding generations of  students and scholars.
Fr. Boileau had many dreams for the Institute, 
some of  which he was able to realize. One was 
the centenary celebration in 1989 of  the Hoger 
Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte and the Institut 
supérieur de Philosophie in Louvain-la-Neuve. 
He was a central player in the celebration, gar-
nering funds from far and wide to bring a huge 
number of  both Institutes’ alumni back to their 
alma mater. With John Dick, he edited Tradition 
and Renewal: Philosophical Essays Commemorating the 
Centennial of Louvain’s Institute of Philosophy (1992-
93). This three-volume collection of  essays, 
many by distinguished scholars, reflected the 
many-sided philosophical history and inherit-
ance of  the Institute.  
Fr. Boileau’s abiding interest in later years 
was in the figure of  Cardinal Mercier, founder 
of  the modern Institute of  Philosophy. He 
scoured libraries for every detail relating to 
Mercier, or sent one of  his many friends on 
the chase. The fruits of  these labours eventu-
ally saw the light in his 1996 biography, Cardinal 
Mercier: A Memoir. In 2002 he edited a collection 
of  Cardinal Mercier’s diverse writings, entitled 
Cardinal Mercier’s Philosophical Essays: A Study in Neo-
Thomism.  These works were acts of  homage to 
Cardinal Mercier and intended to keep alive 
something of  his mission and spirit in altered 
times.  
“Big Dave,” as he was affectionately known 
by his many friends, was a larger than life fig-
ure, as was noted in his many obituaries. Large 
in body – he was some 2m tall – fond of  his 
Duvel and the good things of  life, he was also a 
great-spirited man who loved to talk and to tell 
stories about the many famous and infamous 
people he knew around the world. And his 
acquaintances were wide-ranging, from lumi-
naries of  the philosophical scene to American 
politicians, trade unionists, and ecclesiastical 
dignitaries. It was not always easy to discern in 
his stories where fact ended and fiction began, 
but such niceties were of  no moment: the good 
story was all that mattered.  Ingrid Puncher-
Lombaerts, a long-time administrator in the 
HIW , now retired, and a close friend of  Fr. 
Boileau, remembers him as someone who stood 
out in a crowd, “more like a cowboy who had 
escaped from an old western, or someone who 
might have become a basketball player instead 
of  a priest and philosopher.” Larger than life, 
he is remembered with admiration and affec-
tion in death.   
Ingrid Puncher-Lombaerts and William Desmond   
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in memoriam: 
Fr. ernan mcmullin
Rev. Ernan McMullin, O’Hara Professor 
Emeritus of  Philosophy at the University of  
Notre Dame and a distinguished alumnus of  
the Institute of  Philosophy, died on February 
8th, 2011 in his native Donegal, Ireland. He was 
86 years old.
Fr. McMullin’s life-long interest in inte-
grating philosophy and science began while an 
undergraduate at Maynooth University where 
he studied physics and theology before being 
ordained a priest in 1949. He went on to study 
theoretical physics at the Dublin Institute 
for Advanced Studies under the supervision 
of  the Nobel laureate Erwin Schroedinger, 
and continued his studies at the Institute of  
Philosophy, receiving his doctorate in 1954 for 
a dissertation on the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle. He then joined the faculty of  Notre 
Dame, Indiana where he spent the rest of  his 
academic career, as chair of  the philosophy 
department, Director of  Notre Dame’s well-
known history and philosophy of  science pro-
gramme and of  the Reilly Center for Science, 
Technology and Human Values before retiring 
in 1994. He continued to teach until 2003, and 
for the last seven years of  his life commuted 
between St. Paul, Minnesota and Donegal.
Father McMullin enjoyed an international 
reputation in the area of  the philosophy of  
science, and was most well known for his work 
in the area of  scientific realism. He had a par-
ticular interest in the interface between science 
and religion, and in subjects such as the debates 
on evolution and creation, Darwinism and 
creationism, and the relation between cosmol-
ogy and theology. He engaged in active debate 
on these subjects with figures such as Alvin 
Plantinga whose views he criticised.  He pub-
lished over 200 journal articles and 14 books 
including The Concept of Matter, Newton on Matter 
and Activity, and The Inference that Makes Science. He 
was also an expert on the life of  Galileo and 
his book, The Church and Galileo, is considered to 
offer an important contribution to the ongo-
ing debate about Galileo’s relationship with the 
Church.
During his career, Father McMullin served 
on scholarly committees throughout the world 
and held visiting appointments at numerous 
universities, including Minnesota, Cape Town, 
Los Angeles, Princeton and Yale. The respect 
in which he was held by philosophers of  
widely differing persuasions is reflected in his 
having been elected president by the American 
Philosophical Association, the Philosophy 
of  Science Association, the Metaphysical 
Society of  America and the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association - an achievement 
he often mentioned in a somewhat bemused 
way.  His numerous awards included honor-
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ary degrees from Maynooth, the National 
University of  Ireland, Loyola University in 
Chicago, Stonehill College, and Notre Dame, 
as well as the Aquinas Medal of  the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, and the 
Founder’s Medal of  the Metaphysical Society 
of  America.
An award which gave him much pleasure 
was that of  the Cardinal Mercier Chair at the 
K.U.Leuven in 1994-1995, for which he gave a 
lecture series on “Rationality and Realism in 
the Natural Sciences”.  While he was here a 
symposium was held in his honour on the sub-
ject of  realism in the sciences, and the papers 
were published in Proceedings of the Ernan McMullin 
Symposium by Louvain Philosophical Studies in 
1996. 
Fr. McMullin is remembered by his many 
friends as a friendly, kind and down-to-earth 
man with a penchant for lively conversation 
and good stories.  His generosity to students 
and younger scholars was legendary. His gifts 
as a teacher are evident in the clear and humor-
ous way he could communicate his insights, 
as may be seen in the many videos made of  
his talks and lectures on questions such as 
“What can science say about God?”, “How 
could God know the future?”, or “Would sen-
tient aliens demoralize religion?” (see http://
www.closertotruth.com/participant/Ernan-
McMullin/66). 
Fr. McMullin remained intellectually and 
physically active until death finally caught up 
with him at home in his beloved Donegal. 
William Desmond - with thanks to Ingrid Lombaerts-
Puncher
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new faculty members 
at the institute of 
Philosophy
2010 was a year of changes in staff. Further in this 
journal, you’ll find articles on the professors who left the 
Institute, but first, we’d like to introduce to you our new 
professors. The Institute was happy to welcome three new 
researchers in 2010. By coincidence, all three are members 
of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, which thus renewed 
more than half of its staff. Their offices, on the second 
floor of the Institute’s main building, were rather empty, 
though, at the start of their appointment: Andrea Robiglio, 
the new professor of late Medieval and Renaissance 
Philosophy, commuted between Groningen and Leuven 
for several months, before being able to fully focus on his 
new tasks in Leuven. Jan Opsomer, research professor 
in Ancient Philosophy, worked in Köln during the first 
semester, and Pieter d’Hoine, tenure track professor in 
Ancient Philosophy and successor to Carlos Steel, stayed 
in Paris during the first semester. From the second semester 
on, the whole staff of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre was 
at its post.
Like all Italians, Andrea Robiglio is a fan of Dante, but 
he also likes Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. Recognizable 
by his hat and his elegant walk, he adds some southern flair 
to the Institute’s staff.
Andrea Aldo Robiglio was born in Acqui, an 
old roman town in the south of  Piedmont, 
between Turin and Genoa. He chose to study 
philosophy, since he had the impression that 
in doing philosophy you could read history 
and literature and keep your interest in science. 
He already knew philosophy from high school, 
for in the liceo in Italy one studies philosophy 
for four hours a week. He decided to study at 
the Catholic University of  Milan, because he 
wanted to have the experience of  being away 
from home and because the first secondary 
literature he had read on philosophy at high 
school was written by professors from this 
university (namely Sofia Vanni Rovighi and 
Giovanni Reale). He made his tesi di laurea on 
the Italian reception of  existentialism, in par-
ticular on Cornelio Fabro, who contributed to 
the development of  Italian existentialism and 
was the main Italian student of  Kierkegaard. 
Since Fabro was also a scholar in the field of  
Thomistic studies, Robiglio had the idea to 
write a dissertation on the problem of  freedom 
in medieval thought. His promoter, Adriano 
Bausola, proposed that he limit himself  to the 
‘will’ in Aquinas. “My idea was to make a sys-
tematic (not a historical) work, but if  you want 
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to know an author, you get interested in the 
historical aspects (e.g. the sources). In the end 
I wrote a thesis on the theory of  the acts of  the 
will in Aquinas and his sources and in particular 
on some aspects that were not so often studied 
in the secondary literature.” During the last year 
of  his PhD, Robiglio’s cherished master died 
and prof. Alessandro Ghisalberti became his 
promoter. Between the completion of  his PhD 
and his defence, Robiglio went to Paris for bib-
liographical reasons. Until then, he had been 
“a typical product of  old Italian Academia”, 
without any international experience. After his 
defence, he worked on a project on late medi-
eval intellectual history (in Nijmegen, Leuven, 
Notre Dame, and Freiburg), but since he had 
few teaching commitments, he spent most of  
his time in Paris.
After this strictly historical study on medieval 
intellectual history, Robiglio wanted to elabo-
rate a more personal project on philosophical 
anthropology. “What connects my tesi di laurea 
and my PhD is the interest in philosophical 
anthropology; not only ethics in the strict 
sense, but the conception of  man in history, 
how the figure of  man changes over time. Since 
I worked on Aquinas, I was interested to see 
how the late medieval conception developed 
through the Renaissance. I therefore started to 
work on Dante from the philosophical point 
of  view.” Robiglio received a von Humboldt-
scholarship for two years in Germany and con-
tinued his project last year in Groningen. 
“It was a huge surprise that I could come to 
Leuven, but I am very happy and I find it 
extremely coherent with my interests, with 
my study, also because when the Catholic 
University of  Milan was founded in the 1920’s, 
it took over the model of  this Institute. It is 
like having studied with the son and then going 
to work with the grand-father. I feel at home 
here.”
Professor Robiglio’s current research deals 
with ‘nobility’ in the Renaissance. He studies 
the short scholastic questions ‘de nobilitate’, 
mainly from the 15th century, most of  them 
unedited. In secondary literature you find 
mainly sociological or historical studies on 
nobility, but the discussions have strictly philo-
sophical aspects as well. One is connected with 
the history of  science, namely the eugenetical 
conception, linked with physiognomy - for 
example how should the body be composed in 
order to make the intellect work well? There is 
a more theological aspect as well: nobility may 
be a question of  election, it depends on God’s 
grace; so what is crucial is not so much being 
intelligent, but rather acting in a virtuous way. 
There is a third way of  dealing with the topic, 
a more juridical one, to avoid the risks of  the 
other two approaches. The eugenetic element 
could lead to extreme conclusions. Also, if  
you say that nobility is dependent on God 
alone and that this dependency does not come 
through the channels of  any institution, it 
might turn out to be a quite revolutionary idea. 
According to the juridical argument, nobility 
is always connected with a certain community: 
those who respect the rules of  this community 
are ennobled. One of  the criteria for nobil-
ity, for instance, is teaching for at least twenty 
years without committing crimes. Besides the 
scholastic questions on nobility, there are 
humanistic dialogues on the dignity of  dif-
ferent disciplines; these texts are more literary, 
but they also contain philosophical arguments. 
The first author Robiglio considers here is 
Dante, because he is one of  the first who makes 
explicit his interest in this field and who con-
siders this to be a crucial philosophical issue.
“This semester I was teaching two general 
introductory courses for BA-students, one 
on philosophical anthropology and another 
on modern philosophy. In the second semes-
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ter I shall teach, in collaboration with Russ 
Friedman, the course on Thomas Aquinas, 
in particular on human action. Further, I 
shall teach a master course on Medieval and 
Renaissance Philosophy and Theology for phi-
losophy students and for the students in 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies. I shall deal 
with Dante and the fifteenth-century commen-
taries on the Divine Comedy; I have chosen these 
texts because it is a philosophical course, but 
should also have an interdisciplinary approach. 
An attitude that will remain in all my future 
teaching is that I tend to prefer (even at the 
BA-level) to read primary sources, but to avoid 
the system of  the anthology or reader. The 
students should read a source in its entirety, 
because it forms a unity, and also read the parts 
that prima facie seem not to be ‘useful’. During 
the courses I also like to engage with contem-
porary culture (e.g. movies); I am not a purist.”
The three favourite philosophers of  professor 
Robiglio are Aquinas, Dante and Leibniz. In 
the long run he would like to study Leibniz 
from the perspective of  medieval and scholastic 
thought. “I like Leibniz, but find his writings 
extremely difficult. As Dante would put it: ‘Let 
my long study and great love avail / that made 
me delve so deep into his volumes.’”
Interview by Griet Galle
After years of research at different universities around the 
world, ‘Odysseus’ Jan Opsomer returns to Leuven. As a 
research professor (BOF-ZAP), he only has two courses 
to teach, which allows him to spend many hours on his 
research on late ancient philosophy of nature.
After an international academic journey, Jan 
Opsomer returns to where his academic career 
began: Leuven and the Institute of  Philosophy. 
He successively studied Classical Philology, 
Philosophy and Literature Studies at the 
Catholic University of  Leuven and obtained 
his doctorate at the Faculty of  Arts in 1994. 
From 1994 to 1998, he worked as an NFWO 
post-doctoral researcher associated with the 
De Wulf-Mansion Centre, where he cooper-
ated closely with Carlos Steel. He then went to 
London and assisted as a research fellow in the 
Ancient Commentators project led by Richard 
Sorabji (King’s College London). From 2001 
to 2002, he acquired a tenure track in South 
Carolina, and since 2003 he has worked as a 
professor in the Department of  Philosophy 
in Cologne. Thanks to the Special Research 
Fund, he has now returned to the Institute of  
Philosophy to focus on a research project on 
late ancient philosophy of  nature. 
Jan Opsomer obtained his doctorate with 
Maurits Pinnoy (Faculty of  Arts) on Plutarch’s 
Quaestiones Platonicae, a collection of  10 problems 
related to some statements that Plato uttered in 
his texts. “This work was a good introduction 
to the history of  Platonism,” Opsomer argues, 
“the problems in the Quaestiones come from 
different domains (ontology, philosophy of  
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nature, philosophy of  language, epistemology, 
ethics) and different tendencies in Platonism 
were featured, in particular the so-called ‘scep-
tical’ Academy.” However, the focus of  his 
research changed somewhat after Opsomer 
obtained his doctorate. It was mainly during 
his time working as an NFWO researcher at 
the De Wulf-Mansion Centre that he began to 
focus more on Neo-Platonism: “My research is 
now situated in the field of  late ancient philos-
ophy. That is more or less due to a coincidence: 
because I am classicist and especially a Graecus, 
it seemed logical to work on Greek texts. The 
choice of  authors was also determined by the 
people I could collaborate with: successively 
Maurice Pinnoy / Middle Platonism, Carlos 
Steel / Proclus and Neo-Platonism. I have 
always been interested in ontological questions, 
and in the traditions that I was faced with, I 
found a lot of  dust, a wide range of  concepts, 
precise distinctions and complex arguments.” 
In any case, we find this range of  instruments 
in his current research project on late ancient 
philosophy of  nature. The project has three 
major concerns. In a first part, Opsomer will 
study the debates surrounding geometric atom-
ism, a theory about the structure and physical 
properties of  the elements. Opsomer explains: 
“According to Plato, the traditional four ele-
ments and their properties can be traced back 
to geometrical structures. Aristotle attacks this 
quantitative approach and argues for a more 
qualitative type of  physics (with features such 
as hot / cold, dry / humid as their most fun-
damental properties). The Neo-Platonic com-
mentators on Aristotle defend Plato’s model 
against Aristotle’s criticism and embed this in 
their own metaphysical system. This leads to a 
new, layered ontology of  material properties: at 
all levels, complex combinations of  properties 
supervene with fundamental properties.” In a 
second part, Opsomer will direct himself  to 
the Neo-Platonic analysis of  motion. He uses 
Proclus’ Elementatio Physica as a starting point 
and wants to demonstrate how Proclus accepts 
Aristotle’s arguments and theses about motion, 
divisibility, continuity (of  space, time and the 
moving object) and causes, while preparing 
an integration into the Neo-Platonic context. 
Finally, in a third part, a number of  epistemo-
logical problems will be highlighted, such as 
whether mathematical methods may be used in 
physics, and more in general, the demand for 
the demarcation of  and the transfers between 
scientific domains. 
The first couple of  years, Opsomer will primar-
ily focus on his research project. Nevertheless, 
he will also teach some academic courses. This 
year, he teaches two courses in the International 
programme and next year, also in the Dutch 
programme. “During the first years of  my job 
in Cologne, there were approximately 3000 
students enrolled in philosophy and there were 
only five professors. The teaching load was 
very high and remained high even though the 
number of  students dropped by a third and an 
extra professor was added. But even in those 
circumstances, I have always enjoyed to teach. 
The interaction with students provides new 
energy. I have always felt it to be a very mean-
ingful activity, which is therefore also pleasing: 
helping others to discover ideas, arguments, 
thinkers and texts.” 
Interview by Leen Van Campe
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Philosophy is not the only subject of conversation at the De 
Wulf-Mansion Centre today. Thanks to Pieter d’Hoine, 
contemporary literature and film became a topic of inter-
est as well. The second youngest of all the professors at the 
Institute of Philosophy brings a new touch to a rich and 
proud tradition of research in Platonic and Neo-Platonic 
philosophy.
Pieter d’Hoine studied classical philology in 
Leuven. The topic of  his dissertation, “Plato 
and hermeneutics”, already displays a slumber-
ing interest in philosophy. Then, he moved to 
the Institute of  Philosophy, where he gradu-
ated in 2002 with a thesis on Derrida’s reading 
of  Plato’s Phaedrus. It was that same Plato who 
took the centre stage in his thesis, which he 
wrote under the supervision of  Carlos Steel. 
Currently, Pieter d’Hoine conducts the seminar 
in ancient and medieval philosophy and he also 
teaches the course Introduction to Philosophy at the 
Faculty of  Arts. From next year onwards, he 
will also teach History of Philosophy: Antiquity at 
the Institute of  Philosophy. As a researcher, 
he is connected to the De Wulf-Mansion 
Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance 
Philosophy.
What is your current research about?
My research deals with the philosophy of  clas-
sical antiquity, Neo-Platonism. Proclus, a fifth-
century Athenian philosopher, is an important 
figure there. Proclus is considered to be one of  
the last great pagan philosophers, who, at the 
end of  antiquity, created a synthesis of  ancient 
knowledge and sent the interpretation of  Plato 
(and ancient philosophy in general) far into 
the nineteenth century. Proclus was a prolific 
writer with a very broad interest that ranges 
from metaphysics and theology to philosophy 
of  nature and astronomy to geometry and liter-
ary theory. Within the framework of  my PhD 
research,  I have worked on a critical edition of  
Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. This 
text is one of  our main sources for the recep-
tion of  Plato’s theory in late antiquity. My 
current research fits in with this: I am currently 
working on a book about the role of  the theory 
of  Ideas in the metaphysics of  late antiquity.
Does your ‘first love’, Classical Philology, still play a role 
in your current research?
Sure. It is impossible to properly investigate 
ancient philosophy without a profound knowl-
edge of  ancient languages  and an understanding 
of  the philological methods. By definition, the 
ancient texts that we read are reconstructions 
based upon medieval manuscripts and other 
testimonials. Each word in a philosophical text 
really matters and it is therefore essential for a 
researcher to be able to read the words in their 
original language and to critically work with a 
text edition. In this sense, my research is often 
situated on the interface between philosophy 
and philology. In addition, without my philo-
logical training, I could never have even dreamt 
of  working on the edition project I referred to 
before.
Your studies began and ended in Leuven and you are 
now also employed here. Have you never felt the desire to 
explore other places?
In fact, it tickles quite often. But I must say 
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that I have accumulated some pleasant travel 
experiences in the past. During my studies, 
I have spent two full academic years in Italy, 
and as a postdoctoral researcher, I have spent 
some longer research stays at Princeton and 
Cambridge. Currently, I am in fact on a ‘break’ 
between two research stays of  five months in 
Paris. I find it very enriching to occasionally 
immerse myself  in other academic contexts. In 
Cambridge, for instance, I was impressed by 
the discussion culture that is prevalent there. 
At the CNRS in Paris, I have learnt to ana-
lyse texts to the bone and to read them slowly 
and thoroughly, something that happens far 
too little in Leuven. However, I have never 
complained about the fact that I can always 
return to Leuven afterwards. In my field of  
study, there are not many libraries that are bet-
ter equipped than the one at the Institute of  
Philosophy. Also, with the recent recruitment 
of  Jan Opsomer and the presence of  Gerd Van 
Riel and emeritus Carlos Steel, the De Wulf-
Mansion Centre is a leading research centre for 
philosophy of  late antiquity.
How important is the whole issue of the relevance of an-
cient philosophy for you? Is this a valid issue?
It is an extremely important issue, yet it is 
often misunderstood. The apology of  ancient 
philosophy is sometimes limited to a list of  
ideas and theories that the ancients “already” 
had. But actually, it should be the other way 
around: some of  their ideas are simply so rel-
evant or revolutionary that they literally have 
made history, and they therefore continue to 
inspire us. All of  that must be refined again: 
just as fascinating as the search for similarities 
is the focus on the differences, the strangeness 
of  the tradition. For me, history is still the 
place where the historical prejudices come to 
light and in which we confront and question 
our own obviousnesses. And perhaps this is 
where the real significance of  the history of  
philosophy lies, although I realise that it may 
charm only few commissions or policy makers.
You’ve published on one of the core texts in philosophy: 
Plato’s allegory of the cave. Can you translate this al-
legory into contemporary culture and, if so, how would 
you do it?
The allegory of  the cave essentially deals with 
the ancient problem of  being and appearance: 
they illustrate the philosopher’s belief  that real-
ity is not (necessarily) as it reveals itself  to us 
in everyday experience. The crucial moment in 
the story is the moment of  liberation: when the 
prisoner turns his head for the first time and 
thus places the shadows in the right perspective. 
For the first time, he sees the shadows as shad-
ows and not as reality. In Plato, that change 
in perspective is framed within a metaphysical 
theory: the theory of  Ideas. Today, few are per-
haps convinced that our cave has an exit, that 
there exists a realm of  truth. This “conversion” 
is crucial, however. It expresses aptly what phi-
losophy is really about: learning to see axioms 
from a different perspective, to question them, 
to criticise them.
Apart from that, what particularly fasci-
nates me as well is the fact that the allegory 
as an image continues to fascinate others. It is 
ironic that Plato, despite his strong criticism 
of  mimesis and his suspicions with regard to 
the written word, is today primarily known 
because of  the literary artefact that the beauti-
fully imagined allegory of  the cave really is. I 
am intrigued by how that “original text from 
the mental luggage of  humanity”, as Cornelis 
Verhoeven once called the allegory, continues 
to inspire the artists and writers of  today. That 
is why I am also interested in how Platonic 
themes continue to influence contemporary 
literature and film.
Interview by Guy Claessens
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A story of (un)rest and 
longing
Laudatio for Ignace Verhack on the occasion of his emeritate
On May 7th and 8th, 2010, the Institute of Philosophy 
organised a congress and a solemn academic session on 
the occasion of Prof. Verhack becoming emeritus professor. 
On May 8th, Prof Verhack gave his valedictory lecture on 
How to preserve the longing? Longing, eros, is 
indeed a main theme in the work of Ignace Verhack, as you 
can read in the laudatio below, delivered by Dean Toon 
Vandevelde to one of the last decades’ standard bearers of 
Metaphysics in Leuven. 
Dear vice-rector, colleagues, ladies and gentle-
men, friends and family, former students of  
Professor Verhack,
Dear Ignace,
First of  all, I would like to express my sincer-
est congratulations at the occasion of  your 
emeritate. If  I count well, you spent about two 
thirds of  your life, more than 42 years, at the 
Institute of  Philosophy: first as a student, then 
as a doctoral scholar, assistant, lecturer, and 
professor. So I think we can say now, if  that is 
not putting it too irreverently, you’re part of  
the furniture of  the Institute.
You were always very modest, but this did 
not prevent you from giving shape, together 
with your colleagues, to philosophy in Leuven. 
You were one of  the faces of  philosophy in 
Leuven, not only formally and superficially, 
because you were always there, but also sub-
stantially and intrinsically: you exercised a great 
influence on your colleagues, our students and 
students of  the Theology Faculty thanks to the 
strength of  your thought.
But this did not all come by itself. An emer-
itate is a good occasion to look back and ask 
ourselves how this all happened. Who is this 
person and where do his ideas come from?
Professor Verhack was born in Poperinge in 
1944. He studied at the Saint Stanislas College, 
after which he entered the seminary, as did so 
many boys in these days. After one year at the 
seminary in Bruges, he was sent to the Leo 
XIII seminary in Leuven for the continuation 
of  his studies. In 1966 he obtained the degree 
of  Licentiate in Thomistic Philosophy, after 
which he went to the Gregoriana in Rome for 
four years, to study Theology.
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Those four years in the Belgian House in 
Rome revealed a very new side of  the world to 
Prof. Verhack. In those days, the Flemish semi-
nars trained the future priests in strict isolation 
from the big bad world outside. Of  course, 
sooner or later, young priests were confronted 
with the world, when they engaged in pastoral 
work or landed in a parish, which, sometimes, 
gave cause to smaller or bigger derailments 
or even tragedies – the Belgian press has ex-
tensively reported on this lately. In Rome, on 
the other hand, the seminarians of  the Belgian 
College enjoyed great freedom. They were free 
to go into town – a town which sometimes was 
more a pagan than a holy city – whenever and 
as long as they wanted. And so, Prof. Verhack 
enjoyed some of  his most beautiful years in 
Rome, the city of  culture. He experienced 
a sense of  freedom, and the environment in 
which he lived stimulated self-knowledge. He 
also learned what insiders call the ‘Roman 
feeling’. There was plenty of  sunshine, and the 
occasion to talk to different people of  very 
diverse nationalities, including members of  the 
Roman Curia. He broadened his emotional and 
intellectual horizon. He learned to put things 
into perspective and to be tolerant to differ-
ences of  opinion.
Yet, in the end, Prof. Verhack didn’t choose to 
be ordained a priest. Not because he lost his 
faith or because he was disappointed in the 
Church – Prof. Verhack always stayed a very 
religious man – but because he began to realize 
that celibacy was not his cup of  tea. Indeed, 
Prof. Verhack would later get married and have 
four children.  
In 1970, young Ignace Verhack came back 
to Leuven, first to obtain a legal degree in 
Philosophy, then to work as a part-time assis-
tant of  Professor Vergote.
However, after four years in Rome, it wasn’t 
a flawless return. At the seminary in Bruges, 
and after that in Leuven, Prof. Verhack re-
ceived training in Thomistic Philosophy. He 
wrote his MA thesis on “The natural law in 
Thomas Aquinas”, under the guidance of  
Prof. Verbeke. In Rome, he was strongly influ-
enced by Juan Alfaro, a real Thomist and great 
thinker. Philosophical education in Leuven 
was, in the 1960s, also strongly characterized by 
phenomenology.  
After his return from Rome, however, Prof. 
Verhack discovered the Institute of  Philosophy 
had unrecognizably changed. French structur-
alism, Foucault, Althusser and psychoanalysis 
had almost completely pushed aside phenom-
enology, and Prof. Verhack found it hard to 
find his place in this new intellectual scenery. 
He followed the new path for a while, writing 
his PhD on “The ‘mystical’ in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, but it was 
not with all his heart. He felt squeezed into a 
mental corset, and had the impression, that the 
new language that was spoken at the Institute 
of  Philosophy didn’t allow him to say what he 
wanted to say. He could not immediately find a 
framework that would allow him to think what 
he thought or wanted to think: Thomas was 
not appreciated in this new world, Wittgenstein 
seemed too limited, structuralism was not in-
spiring for him. 
Heidegger came to the rescue. In his 
thought, Prof. Verhack found the framework he 
needed for the deep existential and ontological 
reflection, which he would later on elaborate 
in his dialogue with especially French philoso-
phers: E. Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, J.L. Marion, 
J.L. Chrétien, Jean Nabert, Jean-Yves Lacoste, 
the older Derrida, and here at the Institute of  
Philosophy with W. Desmond, U. Dhondt and 
R. Visker.
Which were the problems that Prof. Verhack 
wanted to explore? It’s a bit dangerous to try to 
summarize it in just a few sentences, but I’ll 
give it a go. It is about the question of  how to 
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preserve the longing, after Nietzsche’s procla-
mation of  the death of  God. Before Nietzsche, 
desire, or eros, was moved by the attraction of  
goodness, truth and beauty. With Nietzsche, 
the idea of  a true world behind the sensible 
world collapses. The question then arises how 
to save the longing, eros, and transcendence. 
As I mentioned before, Prof. Verhack found 
a lead for further research in the thought of  
Heidegger, more particularly where Heidegger 
joins Augustine with his “Inquietum est cor 
nostrum”.
In his major work “De mens en zijn onrust. 
Over het raadsel van de beweging” (“Man and 
his unrest. On the mystery of  movement”), 
a book of  more than 450 pages, published 
by Acco in 2000, Prof. Verhack explores the 
human longing and his restlessness in its on-
tological and existential dimensions (and not 
as a psychological category). Philosophy shows 
us the depths of  human unrest. “Man and his 
unrest” is Prof. Verhack’s magnum opus. It was 
preceded and prepared by a whole series of  
articles, published in different magazines and 
collections, but it is the book that is the most 
impressive. I think I may say that this book 
has lead to a real ‘rehabilitation’ of  the thought 
of  Prof. Verhack, or better: it was the pinnacle 
of  his search for a personal form of  thought, 
a search which had been going on for quite a 
while.
I mentioned before that Prof. Verhack felt a 
bit orphaned when he, in the 1970s, returned to 
the Institute of  Philosophy. Times had changed 
drastically. Prof. Verhack’s philosophical meth-
od and his interest in Philosophy of  Religion 
seemed a relic of  the past. This impression was 
reinforced in 1983, when he published a philo-
sophical book on pedagogical issues. Even the 
title seemed a provocation at that time: “Geen 
zachte hand. Over gezag en orde in gezin en 
school” (“No soft hand. On authority and 
order in family and at school”). In the 1970s 
and 1980s, this definitely ran counter to the 
spirit of  the age. It was a defense of  author-
ity and power, a critique of  subjectivism and 
autonomy, far from evident, and it provided 
the author with negative newspaper reviews and 
pestering phone calls at night, especially from 
people who had only read the title of  the book.
Whoever did read the book – and I read 
extensive parts of  it during the last days – dis-
covered that the theses advanced in the book 
were often unjustly caricatured. Philosophically 
speaking, authority does not come from com-
pulsion, but from a process of  “letting grow”, 
in which the freedom of  the student is re-
spected entirely. That is the main thesis of  this 
book.
That was, however, not how it was per-
ceived in the early 1980s. But, as I said, reha-
bilitation came in the 1990s. When you stay 
true to yourself, sooner or later, you’ll be ‘in’ 
again. Prof. Verhack didn’t bother about trends 
or images. He stayed true to himself. Younger 
colleagues and students regained interest in the 
metaphysical questions that structuralism tried 
to bury. They discovered that Prof. Verhack was 
an expert in contemporary French philosophy 
and had very interesting things to say about it. 
Moreover, Prof. Verhack probably is one 
of  the last philosophers in our country to have 
been taught so thoroughly and studied the 
great 20th Century theologians. He is very well 
acquainted with Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl 
Barth, Karl Rahner, de Lubac – all representing 
the trinitarian theology that pushed Thomism 
into the background in the 20th Century. At 
the Faculty of  Theology, this competence was 
always highly valued.
Metaphysics, philosophy of  religion, the 
relation between Christian faith and contempo-
rary philosophy: those were the topics on which 
Prof. Verhack has been teaching during so many 
years to both philosophers and theologians. He 
also taught philosophy of  education to edu-
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cationalists, and participated in various com-
mittees of  the Flemish Secretariat for Catholic 
Education, where he worked together with 
Mgr. Daelemans and Can. De Wolf. For a long 
period, he also was the president of  the Centre 
for Christian Schools, which originally was an 
organization of  religious orders, working in the 
field of  education, and later in need of  renewal. 
So it is not a coincidence that yesterday and 
this morning, a conference was organized on 
Culture, Religion and Education.
I got to know Prof. Verhack personally 
more than 30 years ago. He was a young lec-
turer, I was a much younger student. We talked 
for almost an hour. It was my de universa exam. 
I can’t remember what we talked about exactly, 
but I do remember that at the end he said: “I 
don’t agree with you, but you defended yourself  
well.” And he gave me a good grade too. Much 
later, he said to me: “You don’t punish students 
for having a different opinion.”
Later, much later, when I became Academic 
Secretary of  the Institute of  Philosophy, I 
discovered that Prof. Verhack was the most 
friendly and obliging of  all our colleagues. 
Changes of  teaching schedule, courses that 
were switched to another semester, replacing a 
colleague that was absent: you just needed to 
ask Prof. Verhack, and if  it was in any way pos-
sible, he always said yes. 
What he didn’t like was the bureaucratic 
nonsense to which teaching became more and 
more connected. (This is one of  the most im-
portant reasons why, a few years ago, when he 
felt his forces fail a little, he asked for an early 
retirement.) But even after that, during the last 
years, he continued to teach his Metaphysics 
course with great dedication. A remarkable fact 
is also that Prof. Verhack, together with Prof. 
Van de Wiele, was the first to introduce the use 
of  computers at the Institute of  Philosophy, 
long before his more ‘progressive’ colleagues 
even thought about it.
So, during all those years, we got to know 
Prof. Verhach as a very honest and righteous 
man, a friendly colleague and an authentic 
philosopher with profound thoughts, highly 
appreciated not only by our own students, but 
also by the theologians. At the occasion of  his 
retirement, Prof. Verhack might stop teaching, 
but he will certainly not stop philosophizing. 
He is still very busy with the second or third re-
daction of  a new book Talking about God. Is there 
still a God after the end of  Metaphysics? What 
do we mean when we say ‘God’? These are the 
questions to which Prof. Verhack tries to for-
mulate an answer in this book. The problem is 
that book publishers, in this nursery-like world, 
don’t like huge books with 450 pages of  pure 
and rather abstract philosophy anymore. But I 
really think it should be possible to find a pub-
lisher, be it, maybe, for a somewhat shortened 
version. We all are curious and look forward to 
this publication.
Dear Ignace,
In your book “Man and his unrest” I read: 
“On n’est pas vieux tant que l’on cherche.” I 
am convinced that your thinking hasn’t reached 
its end yet. I can’t imagine this emeritate would 
mean the end of  your dialogue with Levinas, 
Heidegger and Marion. We hope we will be 
able, from time to time, to share your reflec-
tion. We wish you all the best!
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Comparative and intercultural 
Philosophy: 
necessary and not so necessary 
Possibility Conditions*
Thursday Lecture by Jaap van Brakel (K.U.Leuven), 
14 October 2010
Introduction
For about a century there has been such 
a thing as “comparative philosophy”, tradi-
tionally associated with comparing European-
Western philosophy and “Eastern” philosophy, 
in particular Chinese and Indian philosophy. 
Comparative philosophy is institutionally em-
bedded with its own journals and conferences. 
However, it is rare to find a “comparative phi-
losopher” in a philosophy department, which 
may be indicative of  the fact that comparative 
philosophy has often not been considered phi-
losophy. The phrase “intercultural philosophy” 
is of  more recent use. On the one hand, this 
phrase is used by authors who are part of  the 
tradition of  comparative philosophy and who 
publish in English. Here the possible differ-
ence between the adjectives ‘comparative’ and 
‘intercultural’ may well fade away in the future.
On the other hand there are authors who pub-
lish primarily in German and stand in a broadly 
hermeneutical tradition. They prefer the label 
“intercultural philosophy” and criticise com-
parative philosophy for being too positivistic 
and too limited in its range (e.g. by excluding 
Africa). In passing I may note that there is 
a second variant of  intercultural philosophy 
advocated in the German literature.  Some see 
in Heidegger’s philosophy the beginnings of  a 
genuine intercultural philosophy.
This presentation contains some programmatic 
remarks concerning the following research 
question: Consider philosophical traditions 
associated with or embedded in “very” dif-
ferent cultural and historical contexts. These 
traditions are considered together (by a third 
party: “comparative philosophy”) or come 
into contact with one another (“intercultural 
philosophical dialogue”). What are the neces-
sary and not so necessary conditions for this 
kind of  comparison/interaction to be possible? 
How can we speak meaningfully about “simi-
larities and differences” in this context? Which 
language will we use to speak about alleged 
similarities and differences? 
Ideal-language-syndrome
If  one places the issue of  language central 
stage, as I do, it follows that it doesn’t make 
much sense to advocate, for example, a phi-
losophy that transcends all local philosophies, 
integrating all philosophies into one coherent 
world picture or presenting a unified picture 
of  contrasts and complementarities, without ad-
dressing the issue of language. Can we justify there 
to be one ideal language, in which this unified 
world picture is to be presented? This is not to 
say that the idea of  a universal world philoso-
phy may not seem to be attractive. Consider 
as an example Zhuangzi, a contemporary of  
Aristotle, who dreamt that he is transformed 
in a butterfly; waking up, he wonders whether 
he is a butterfly dreaming it is transformed in 
* This text doesn’t contain notes or references. You may not cite this text.
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Zhuangzi. Allinson, in defending his universal 
world philosophy, claims Zhuangzi is engaged 
in the same “research program” as Descartes 
and his thought experiment. 
Explicit commitment to an ideal language ap-
proach one finds in Leibniz and Frege, but 
it can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. 
Descartes wrote to Mersenne: “I would dare 
to hope for a universal language very easy to 
learn, to speak, and to write. The greatest 
advantage of  such a language would be the 
assistance it would give to men’s judgment, 
representing matters so clearly that it would be 
almost impossible to go wrong.” Frege was the 
first to give a “modern” definition of  an ideal 
language. An ideal language has to be objective, 
exact, compositional and truth-functional. 
In the twentieth century the trail of  the ideal 
language syndrome reveals itself  in unexpected 
places. For example, Charles Taylor advocates a 
presumably universal language of  perspicuous 
contrast “in which the possible human vari-
ations would be so formulated that both our 
form of  life and theirs could be perspicuously 
described as alternative such variations”. One 
can also find remnants of  the ideal language 
paradigm in those theories of  communication 
that advocate parties to work together on a 
shared language as they go along. As Gadamer 
famously stipulated: “Every conversation pre-
supposes a common language, or, it creates a 
common language.” Others in this tradition 
speak of  a language-in-between. Habermas’ 
theory of  communicative interaction also suf-
fers from the ideal language syndrome.
I use the expression “ideal language syndrome” 
to include any account that refers to some sort 
of  common language as the ideal for intercul-
tural communication, interpretation, or com-
parison. A minimal requirement to deal with 
the seductive ideal-language-syndrome might 
be to require that, in principle, results of  inter-
cultural or comparative philosophy should be 
formulated in at least two unrelated languages.
The ideal language syndrome also comes in the 
disguise of  dictionaries and grammar books, 
which standardise and regiment languages. For 
more than a century, linguists have been busy 
regimenting the remaining languages of  the 
world. For an even longer period languages 
have been accommodating themselves to the 
dominance of  western science and technology.  
An example is the adjustment of  languages 
around the world to include a set of  basic 
colour terms, exported from Europe together 
with paints, dyestuffs, and other products of  
modern (nineteenth century) technology. Such 
centre-periphery forces are at work everywhere, 
even within Europe. For example the colour vo-
cabulary of  “original” Welsh has adjusted itself  
to the dominant English language. 
De-essentialisation across the board
In response to the omnipresence of  the ideal 
language syndrome, I propose de-essential-
isation. Languages and meanings should be 
de-essentialised. The meanings of  utterances 
(including inscriptions) have a vagueness and 
flexibility that resists ultimate rational recon-
struction, but this is necessary for successful 
dialogue, good interpretation, cognitive coop-
eration, social engagement, intercultural philo-
sophical dialogue, poetic wanderings, and even 
fundamental physics. 
The de-essentialisation across the board 
paradigm can be seen as an elaboration of  
Wittgenstein’s notion of  family resemblance: 
similarities and differences crop up and disap-
pear, but there are no cores, neither “universal-
istic” cores, nor “relativistic” (local) cores. Both 
universalist and relativist are suffering from the 
ideal language syndrome. 
Unfortunately, due to the attractions of  an 
ideal language, many philosophers and other 
academics believe that the belief  in at least a 
number of  important cognitive or linguistic 
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universals with transculturally valid cores or es-
sences is fully justified. As an example consider 
the proposals to the effect that the category 
“emotions” together with a limited number of  
basic emotions such as being angry or being 
sad, is a human universal. Now consider the 
differences and similarities between contem-
porary English and the Ifaluk language, and in 
particular the Ifaluk word song. Anthropological 
research shows that Ifaluk song can be glossed 
most succinctly as ‘justified anger’, which no-
tion plays an essential role in relation to moral 
judgements.  There are obvious similarities 
between ‘anger’ and song, but there is no need 
to insist that either the essence of  the alleged 
universal includes the feature “being justified” 
or not. Similarly, there is no need to presuppose 
that the domain “emotion(s)” has a transcul-
turally valid core or essence (to be “discovered” 
by scientists or philosophers). I may note in 
passing that the word ‘anger’ in English-English 
shows that its current meaning fades away if  
one goes back in time. 
Philosophical categories should not be ex-
cluded from de-essentialisation. Therefore it is 
not good practice to provide word lists giving 
categorical nouns in a European language, as a 
translation of  the “corresponding” expressions 
from a non-western tradition. Presenting such 
lists too easily leads one to believe that, for 
example, ‘精 jīng’ and ‘essence’ name the same 
thing with the same essence.
Also philosophy has to be de-essentialised. 
If  traditions X and Y recognise each other as 
(to some extent, in certain respects) a philo-
sophical tradition, then there is room for inter-
cultural philosophical dialogue or comparison. 
It is not required that X and Y share the same 
notion of  philosophy. Substantial criteria for 
what philosophy is need not be presupposed.
Why should we de-essentialise meanings? 
Not to downgrade them, but because we are 
always interpreting, giving meaning, to many 
utterances, many beliefs, and so on, of  many 
people (including ourselves), and all this at the 
same time. 
No Need to Speak the Same Language
Language is full of  ambiguities, malapropisms 
and hybridities, without obstructing communi-
cation or interpretation in a principled way. 
This is the, rather trivial, empirical basis for my 
slogan “no need to speak the same language.” 
First contacts are encounters of  people who 
meet one another for the first time and don’t 
know anything about the other party; in partic-
ular they don’t know each other’s language. For 
example: trading starts at once and during the 
first evening “together”, they are making music 
for one another. No need to speak the same 
language. “First contacts” show ccommunica-
tion is possible without sharing a language or 
understanding the language of  the other. Non-
verbal behaviour can be interpreted directly as 
rational, meaningful, immoral, and so on (by 
the lights of  the interpreter). However, no uni-
versal body language needs to be presupposed. 
Consider next an example of  communi-
cative interaction involving interpreters. The 
Waitangi treaty was written in both Maori 
and English. Both texts are authoritative and 
have distinct traditions of  interpretation, with 
different conceptions of  history, evidence, 
argument and government. The treaty is still 
subject of  interpretation in court cases in New 
Zealand. No need to speak the same language.
A more theoretical consideration comes 
from Davidson, who has argued that in the 
sense in which language is often understood by 
linguists and philosophers it does not exist, i.e. 
language as being shared, learnt, and ruled by 
conventions and innate ideas. At best there are 
passing idiolects that are shared. 
In order for communicative interaction to 
proceed there is no need to share a language, 
not even a newly created common language. If  
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communicative interaction is taking place, par-
ticipants in the endeavour will exploit whatever 
common ground they can find. But different 
participants may see and experience different 
apparently common grounds and in particular 
may give very different descriptions of  the en-
counter and shared world they participate in. 
Traditions
I will use the letters X, Y, and Z to refer to phi-
losophers or texts from different traditions. If  
a philosopher X enters into discussion with a 
philosopher Y, we have a case of  (intercultural) 
philosophical dialogue. Z is a tradition or phi-
losopher who compares (the philosophy of ) X 
and Y and enters into discussion with X and Y. 
A tradition is heterogeneous; it shouldn’t be 
essentialised. That being said we can say that 
French or Japanese philosophy are traditions, 
as are phenomenology and Daoism. There 
are no rules stipulating “how big” a tradition 
should be, but a tradition having a (more or 
less) shared language or discourse is an im-
portant criterion. Whether we actually speak 
of  intercultural philosophical dialogue or not 
will depend on the “distance” between X and 
Y. Most of  us will not consider a discussion 
between Heidegger and Carnap, as a case of  in-
tercultural philosophical dialogue, even though 
they might be considered different traditions 
in statu nascendi. Usually we will only think of  
intercultural or comparative dimensions if, say, 
Heidegger’s Weg and Laozi’s dao are compared. 
Conceptual schemes and form(s) of life
As I use the colloquial word ‘tradition’ it is to 
be associated with the more technical philo-
sophical notions of  “form of  life” (or “life-
world”)  and “conceptual scheme”. Roughly 
speaking ‘form of  life’ refers to the cultural 
environment of  the philosopher, ‘conceptual 
scheme’ to the philosophical theories and re-
flections in a tradition.
Formally speaking, a conceptual scheme 
(which can also be considered a regimented 
language) is a set of  predicates that sorts the 
objects and categories in its domain.  Such a 
scheme (or language) aims to fix the discourse 
or language game of  “is the same thing as” and 
“has the same meaning as” (within the scope 
of  the scheme). Conceptual schemes often 
aim at becoming ideal languages of  one sort 
or another. But the choice and evaluation of  
a particular conceptual scheme is ultimately 
grounded in (de-essentialised) human lifeforms 
and their language games.
It is important to recognize that philoso-
phers and other people use indefinite manifolds 
of  schemes simultaneously. Each right scheme 
must fit a world, but each utterance about such 
a world is a co-production of  many schemes. A 
discussion restricted to one particular scheme 
(e.g. a particular scientific theory or the inter-
pretation of  a specific ancient text) draws on 
a background of  forms of  life and language 
games, which can only be hinted at by present-
ing more schemes.
Hence, when speaking about similarities 
and differences one has to be aware that such 
observations are always relative to numerous con-
ceptual schemes. There is no universal “ideal” 
language to transcend this hermeneutic relativ-
ity. 
Strictly speaking to ask for an explanation 
or definition of  “form(s) of  life” makes no 
sense. Lifeworld(s) are constituted by pat-
terns of  human activity, which cannot be given 
one final explanation or interpretation, simply 
because they are the ground on which any jus-
tification or interpretation rests. They are the 
background or rock bottom relative to which 
something can be said to be right or wrong. 
By writing ‘lifeworld(s)’ or ‘form(s) of  life’, 
with the pluralizing ‘s’ in brackets, I mean to 
refer to the singular and the plural at the same 
time. It is also meant to convey that the “pre-
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notional” notion “form(s) of  life” or “life 
world(s)” should be taken as empirical as well as 
transcendental grounding, as having universal as 
well as local range. 
There is both one and many human forms 
of  life. It would be incorrect to talk of  many 
human forms of  life, because all have in com-
mon their humanness. There is one human 
form of  life as distinct from the form of  life 
of  lions. But it would also be incorrect to talk 
about one human form of  life, because simi-
larities and differences crop up and disappear, 
without there being a common core. To be a 
human person, it is both an empirical and a 
transcendental precondition that one is em-
bedded in the certainties of  particular forms 
of  life. But at the same time one is capable of  
making some sense of  and dealing with the 
indefinite variety of  human lifeform(s).
There are always similarities between forms 
of  life, but what these similarities seem to be 
is dependent on the lifeworlds compared and 
the conceptual and other resources available to 
those making the comparisons. “What is simi-
lar?” is what human beings would recognize 
as similar in first or other contacts. What is 
similar has to be claimed in all human interac-
tions, in all interpretative endeavours – where 
“claimed” should not be understood in indi-
vidualistic terms, but as part of  a complicated 
process of  triangulation between different in-
terpreters, traditions, their Umwelt, and their 
history. 
XY/YX model of interpretation
Now I will propose a simplified model char-
acterising intercultural communicative inter-
action including intercultural philosophical 
dialogue, as well as comparative philosophy, 
the latter seen as a complex of  intercultural 
dialogues. Although there are of  course dif-
ferences between, say, face-to-face intercultural 
communication between two living human be-
ings and the interpretation of  an ancient text, 
the basic features of  the model are the same for 
any case of  interpretation. 
Consider a person X, being interpreted by 
person Y. Assume Y has direct access to [if  ap-
plicable; if  not see Q]: 
A.  X’s (untranslated, uninterpreted) utterances 
(including what X has written);
B.  X’s behaviour; 
C.  Specific circumstances in which X is situ-
ated. 
In addition Y has his/her own background:
P.  Y’s beliefs, opinions, expectations, inten-
tions, values, etc.; including Y’s conception 
of  human beings;
Q.  Y’s knowledge concerning what others have 
said about ABC and KLM. This includes 
knowledge about the language community 
of  X and more generally the historical em-
beddedness of  ABC/KLM.
Depending on specifics, B and C may be 
more important than Q (as in so-called “first 
contacts”) or, the typical situation in compara-
tive philosophy, C is only indirectly accessible 
via Q (and very little may be known about B).
ABC and PQ allow Y to generate hypoth-
eses that may help Y to interpret/understand 
the following:
K.  meanings of  X’s utterances (i.e. “transla-
tions” of  A in terms of  Y’s language);
L.  beliefs, opinions, goals, and other attitudes 
of  X, including X’s reasons/motivations 
for uttering A;
M. presupposed background of  K and L (and 
hence ABC); as well as the background of  
PQ.
Of course, drawing on what others have 
said about ABC/KLM already involves this 
model. Of  course, one may criticise the sim-
ple model for artificially separating ABC and 
KLM. Of  course, one may propose finer 
discriminations and more “parameters”. But 
the general point of  the simple model remains 
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the same: to stress that always many things are 
interpreted at the same time. 
The problem of  interpretation can now 
be formulated as follows: How does Y inter-
pret KLM with the help of  ABC given PQ? 
Although this model, like any model, is a 
simplification and idealisation, several things 
of  interest may already be noted: Results with 
respect to KLM are added to PQ, but the 
original PQ cannot be completely eliminated 
or transcended (hermeneutic relativity). KLM 
form a holistic whole; they cannot be interpret-
ed separately (hermeneutic circle). For example, 
beliefs of  X and meanings of  X’s words are 
always interpreted together. Similarly, meanings 
of  many words and utterances are interpreted 
at the same time. There is holism across the 
board; hence a high degree of  underdetermina-
tion. However, because hermeneutic relativity 
cannot be avoided, there is always a beginning 
of  interpretation.
XYZ-model
The XY-model of  interpretation can also be 
read as a model of  a philosopher Z inter-
preting a philosopher X or Y who isn’t alive 
anymore, although in that case direct mutual 
interpretation is not possible. However, usually 
many other Z will be involved in the project 
of  interpreting X or Y. Some Z in particular 
will claim to speak “on behalf  of ” X or Y. 
Then interpreting X can be understood as a 
dialogue among a number of  Zj, represent-
ing X - in short X(Zj), and similarly for the 
dialogue among Zk, representing Y – in short 
Y(Zk). In addition all commentators who are 
not alive anymore have to be presented by some 
contemporary Zi.
A comparison of  X and Y by some Z 
can be seen as some Zi comparing X(Zj) and 
Y(Zk). The basic dialogical model applies 
with the addition of  the principle of  com-
parison: If  a number of  Zi compare X(Zj) 
and Y(Zk) then these Zi should simulate a 
dialogue between X(Zj) and Y(Zk) and engage in 
dialogue with X(Zj) and Y(Zk) respectively, all 
the time being in dialogue among themselves. 
Throughout the principle of  no need to speak 
the same language holds.
Then the XYZ-model can be summarised in 
the following formula:
Zi[X(Zj)Y(Zk)]
– a number of  philosophers Zi are in dialogue 
concerning the comparison of  X (as represent-
ed by Zj) and Y (as represented by Zk), by set-
ting up an imaginary dialogue between X and 
Y. Of  course any individual philosopher may 
come under more than one of  the parameters 
X, Y, Zi, Zj, or Zk,
Principle of mutual attunement
Because of  holism and underdetermination 
there has to be some sort of  constraint for 
interpretation to be possible at all. The prin-
ciple of  mutual attunement (which has some 
similarity to the well-known principle of  char-
ity) says: Y must presuppose that X is usually 
sincere, most of  the time speaks the truth, on 
the whole is consistent, and often aims for the 
good -- all of  this according to the criteria of  
Y, formulated in Y’s language (and similarly for 
X with respect to Y). 
There is no factual or other basis for what is 
the right interpretation of  any particular expres-
sion, no matter how “basic” it is. Every par-
ticular interpretation depends on innumerable 
other interpretations, each of  which can be 
wrong, but many have to be right lest any sense 
of  interpretation is lost. Any concrete situation 
of  interpreting a text, philosopher, tradition, is 
underdetermined by the “data”, the fact that 
meanings, beliefs, intentions and such like are 
all interpreted at the same time. For example, if  Y 
notices an inconsistency in the beliefs of  X, the 
conclusion of  inconsistency (in terms of  Y’s 
criteria of  course) may be well supported, but 
28   the leuven philosophy newsletter, volume 18, 2010-2011
it may be possible to remove the inconsistency 
by assuming the meaning or force of  some of  
X’s utterances to be different.
The principle of  mutual attunement is applied 
in terms of  the criteria of  the interpreter, but 
as the interpretation of  X by Y advances, the 
interpreter may also start to interpret by X’s 
lights (as understood by Y’s lights of  course). 
I am not assuming that the principle of  mutual 
attunement itself  is a universal. For example, 
because the universality of  the semantic truth 
predicate is contentious, it may be better to 
formulate the principle of  mutual attunement 
in terms of  an admittedly rather vague notion 
of  rightness, taking various kinds of  truth 
(assertability, validity, etc.) as subordinate to 
rightness.
In passing I may note that perhaps too 
often characters in ancient Chinese that might 
best be translated as right/not-right have been 
translated as true/false in an attempt to make 
ancient Chinese philosophers more similar to 
ancient Greek philosophers. Translating 是/非 
shì /fēi as true/false may be simply false.
Of  course, if  one believes having independent 
reasons to presuppose some kind of  universals, 
the open-endedness and undeterminedness of  
the process of  interpretation can be limited 
considerably. I propose that the principle of  
mutual attunement is the only necessary presup-
position needed for interpretation, apart from 
the more basic assumption that the other is a 
human being, towards whom one is having an 
attitude that is, in Wittgenstein’s words, “an 
attitude towards a soul”. Other universalistic 
assumptions may make the task easier, but they 
are not necessary and therefore better avoided, 
because almost always they will introduce 
asymmetries or other distortions.
No need for cognitive or cultural 
universals
Most research in comparative philosophy takes 
the existence of  universals for granted. The 
two major western databases to search ancient 
Chinese texts use a simple English-language 
classification of  categories to order Chinese 
words or characters in their dictionaries. As 
this may be easily overlooked because the re-
searcher (whether European or Chinese) has 
been educated in terms of  these well-known 
basic categories, I will give a couple of  quick 
examples. In one of  the databases (Thesaurus 
Linguae Sericae), it is taken for granted that the 
character 色 sè, referring to the domain of  ap-
pearance or colour, is embedded in a universal 
taxonomy which has as its metaphysical basis 
objects with subjectively perceived features. 
In another widely used database (Chinese 
Text Project), the central character 情 qíng is 
simply rendered as ‘emotion, sentiment, feel-
ing’, although it is well known that it isn’t that 
simple. Depending on author and context 情 
qíng may be given very different translations. 
Furthermore, insisting on ‘emotion’ as the 
translation of  qíng leads to “anomalies” such 
as coming across “distinguishing right and 
wrong” in a list of  “emotions” (i.e. qíng!), lead-
ing one commentator to criticize the author 
for “confusing the rational and the emotional 
spheres”. I would say the commentator is per-
haps using the wrong criteria for distinguishing 
right and wrong. This example brings us to 
my last section: centre/periphery effects in the 
globalised world.
 But let me first stress that I am not 
denying that there are always numerous simi-
larities. What is denied is that there is or is a 
need for one essence or basic taxonomy that 
can serve as a fixed point of  reference for in-
tercultural translation and interpretation. The 
de-essentialisation and no need to speak the 
same language paradigm leave ample room for 
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observing similarities and differences, without 
being confronted with conflicting  “essences” 
or imposing allegedly universal “essences” . 
Centre/periphery effects in the globalised 
world
It has been said that in the twentieth century 
Chinese philosophers have spent more time 
discussing how to translate philosophical words 
such as ‘being’ and ‘existence’ into Chinese than 
discussing the significance or meaning of  
these words. In what we might call different 
functions of  ‘to be’ were clearly separated in 
ancient Chinese: existence, predication, and so 
on. Should we therefore conclude that the verb 
‘to be’ doesn’t exist in classical Chinese as the 
French Sinologist Jullien concluded? I leave 
that for you to decide. In response to transla-
tion problems involving ‘to be’ and ‘Being’, 
Yú Jìyuán has proposed to impose a revision-
ary metaphysics on the Chinese language by 
stipulating that 是 shì is to become the literal 
translation of  the verb ‘to be’, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the current meaning of  shì 
doesn’t include the existence-meaning of   ‘to 
be’ and only partly covers the copula function 
of  ‘to be’. If  Yú’s proposal would find support, 
it would be a very clear and fundamental case 
of  the periphery adjusting itself  to the centre.
From the beginning of  comparative philosophy 
there has been a strong tendency to assume 
that if  there were philosophy in a non-western 
tradition then it would discuss the same philo-
sophical issues using the same categories as 
western philosophers. This led to reading into 
classical Chinese texts western philosophical 
notions such as ‘truth’, ‘absoluteness’ and ‘tran-
scendence’, without much if  any justification. 
This phenomenon, although not universally 
acknowledged, is now well documented, and 
has been referred to as the “transcendental 
pretence.” 
Furthermore, in the contemporary glo-
balised world, every philosopher has been influ-
enced to a greater or lesser extent by European 
history of  ideas. The cooperative effort of  Li 
Chih-tsao and Francisco Furtado concerning 
the translation of  a Latin edition and com-
mentary of  Aristotle’s Categoriae into Chinese 
in the seventeenth century may have been a 
relatively pure case of  intercultural encounter, 
but in the world of  today a philosopher in 
China or Africa (or Europe or America for that 
matter) is not free to think completely free of  
European influences. As Heidegger remarked 
half  a century ago, after raising the question 
of  the accessibility to Western thought of  “the 
ancient world of  the Indies, China and Japan”,
This question becomes even more 
urgent, because European thinking is 
threatening to become planetary, in 
that contemporary Indians, Chinese 
and Japanese can usually bring to 
us what is experienced by them only 
through our European way of  think-
ing. 
The process of  globalisation, which Heidegger 
refers to with the word ‘planetarization’, causes 
a form of  hermeneutic relativity that is be-
coming more and more difficult to be aware 
of. Even a Chinese philosopher working in 
China, specialising in Chinese philosophy, and 
publishing only in Chinese cannot avoid the 
globalised academic world anymore.
Conclusions
By way of  conclusion I list some pointers:
First of  all, de-essentialisation across the board: 
no need to share the same ways of  grouping 
things together. No need for (m)any (cogni-
tive, emotive, linguistic, cultural, philosophi-
cal) universals. No “ideal language.” Instead: 
family resemblances but no cores; manifold of  
lifeworlds and conceptual schemes. Forms of  
life and conceptual schemes, hence traditions, 
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always show similarities, though such similari-
ties are seen and embedded differently in dif-
ferent forms of  life and conceptual schemes. 
No need to speak the same language. No 
need for a language “in-between.” There is no 
need to share the same philosophical categories 
or have the same understanding of  philosophy. 
Whatever philosophy is, it cannot be separated 
from particular languages used. Ideally, results 
of  interlinguistic metaphilosophy such as inter-
cultural and comparative philosophy should be 
formulated in at least two unrelated languages.
An extension of  radical translation/inter-
pretation and “first contacts” methodology can 
serve as a model for intercultural communica-
tion and therefore also for intercultural philo-
sophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. 
A translation, which is always already an in-
terpretation, is like a (scientific) theory: it is 
underdetermined by the data. Meanings, logi-
cal structure, beliefs, commitments, and so on 
must be simultaneously ascribed or interpreted.
Contemporary philosophers can speak on 
behalf  of  thinkers who are not alive anymore. 
Accessibility and interpretation of  philosophi-
cal thought is a matter of  degree, subject to 
the principle of  mutual attunement. Strictly 
speaking every interpretation is “radical” in-
terpretation. Strictly speaking all philosophy 
is comparative philosophy, i.e. intercultural 
philosophical dialogue.
A principle of  mutual attunement is the 
only necessary presupposition for any form of  
interpretation or communicative interaction. 
In intercultural philosophical dialogue both 
sides have to assume that the other is having a 
largely correct picture of  the common world. 
However, these two largely correct pictures of  
the world don’t have to be the same.
The common forms of  universalism and 
relativism both suffer from the ideal language 
syndrome. Without the ideal language assump-
tion, impossibility arguments (incommensu-
rability, untranslatibility, etc.) can easily be 
dismissed. The major hurdles in gaining access 
to other traditions are raised by processes of  
globalisation and other centre-periphery forces.
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Laudatio for Carlos steel  
by richard sorabji
27 November 2010
Dear Rector, Dear President of  the European 
Council, Dear Minister of  State, Dear President 
of  the K.U.Leuven Association, Dear Honorary 
Rector, Vice-rectors, Honorary Board Members, 
members of  the Academic Council, Dear col-
leagues,  Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Carlos,
It is an honour for me to have been invited to 
present the laudatio for Professor Carlos Steel 
in front of  this august audience. Each of  us, 
Carlos and myself, has made a special study of  
a period of  1100 years of  Philosophy, and we 
overlap over a 400-year period.
Carlos has recreated the great reputation 
of  Leuven as a world centre for the study of  
ancient and medieval philosophy, starting at 
a time of  uncertainty and change. One area 
in which I have been privileged to witness the 
fruits of  his labours is the creation of  a body 
of  postgraduates and postdoctoral fellows in 
the subject that is unsurpassed in the world. He 
has placed them in positions in various parts of  
Europe, and three of  them, who are here today, 
are in Leuven itself. One of  these, Professor Jan 
Opsomer, spent a year with me in London as 
a postdoctoral fellow, and in a very short time, 
has occupied a chair in Cologne and returned 
to a post here in Leuven. Several of  them have 
helped me by checking translations, Opsomer 
by co-authoring with Carlos translations, of  
philosophical texts from the period of  our 
overlap. On one occasion when I visited here, I 
heard Carlos with his students and postdoctoral 
fellows take to the microphone and sing cabaret 
songs. This activity was not inspired by Plato’s 
view of  music that we have been discussing in 
our celebratory seminar, that music is one of  
the blessings of  madness. It is, I think, a mark 
of  leadership to be able to relax with one’s stu-
dents and young colleagues as easily as to apply 
rigorous supervision to their studies.
Carlos was Dean of  the Higher Institute 
of  Philosophy for a period of  no less than 9 
years. During that time, he made the library of  
the Institute the envy of  Europe in his subject. 
He brought as visitors to it some of  the best 
known analytic philosophers of  England and 
America, Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel and 
Martha Nussbaum. He has himself  given the 
Erasmus lectures in Harvard, and the leading 
annual lecture in Ancient Philosophy at the 
Institute of  Classical Studies in London, the 
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Kassman lecture. He has spent a term with me 
at Oxford University, giving a joint seminar 
on ancient treatments of  the Self, the subject 
of  his first book, co-authored with Fernand 
Bossier, which has never been superseded. At 
New York University he joined me in a seminar 
on the question, ‘Are ideas indestructible?’ On 
this subject he has himself  written a charac-
teristically original paper, asking the seminal 
question: why in the Middle Ages was so little 
Plato made available in Latin, whereas huge 
quantities of  Aristotle were accessible?
In publication, Carlos has edited so 
many volumes about Ancient and Medieval 
Philosophy for the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, 
which he has directed, that I have lost count 
of  the number. They are published by the 
Leuven University Press, of  which he has been 
President, and it is noteworthy that several of  
them were written by those very postdoctoral 
fellows of  his whom I mentioned before. He 
has continued as editor of  the series Aristoteles 
Latinus, which was founded in Oxford by a 
great scholar an Italian refugee from Mussolini, 
Minio-Paluello. It publishes editions of  Latin 
translations of  Aristotle from the Middle Ages. 
I knew Minio-Paluello, a charming man, but 
a shy recluse, whose work did not win such 
wide recognition as it deserved outside the 
circle of  experts. Nobody would call Carlos a 
recluse, and the series under his editorship has 
expanded in prominence. 
Producing a critical edition of  a text has 
traditionally been thought the highest test of  
classical scholarship, and many scholars have 
rested their careers on one edition. Among 
Carlos’ numerous editions of  ancient and 
medieval philosophical texts, a good number 
are critical editions, and perhaps his greatest 
achievement is his critical edition in 3 volumes 
of  the Oxford Classical Text of  a commentary 
on Plato’s Parmenides, by a Neoplatonist of  the 
5th century of  our era: Proclus. The commen-
tary has a special importance, forming as it did 
the culmination of  the Neoplatonist teaching 
curriculum. The historical Parmenides had ar-
gued for a view that in a different version was 
to unite Schopenhauer with Indian thought, 
that in reality there is only one being. Plato’s 
Parmenides had analysed the contradictions that 
arise from trying to describe that being. The 
Neoplatonists took the view that that being 
was above being and was the supreme God, and 
that the contradictions revealed that the su-
preme God was indescribable, thus influencing 
a strand of  mystical thought in Christianity. 
It is not surprising that Carlos has been made 
the President of  the 7th Platonic Academy, a 
re-foundation of  Plato’s original institution, 
whose existence was never continuous.
Carlos and I have had a great deal in com-
mon. He is author or co-author for a series of  
mine of  five translations of  philosophical works 
by Athenian Neoplatonists from our period of  
overlap. Three by Proclus are uniquely revealing 
about the moral philosophy of  the period. The 
other two, on Neoplatonist psychology, had 
had their authorship reassigned by Carlos and 
Fernand Bossier from Simplicius to Priscian, 
two of  the last philosophers of  the Athenian 
school, before its teaching was stopped by 
the Christian Emperor Justinian. What is the 
importance of  works of  this period? The im-
portance is that they provide a missing link in 
the history of  Western Philosophy. There was 
a love/hate relationship between Christian and 
pagan philosophers. Each side claimed that 
thinkers on the opposite side contradicted 
each other. The Neoplatonists maintained that, 
on the contrary, Plato and his argumentative 
pupil, Aristotle, agreed with each other. To 
make this improbable proposition plausible, 
the Neoplatonists attempted the very difficult 
task of  arguing that Aristotle, like Plato, be-
lieved in a creator God, an immortal individual 
human soul, and in Divine Providence for all 
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that happens on earth – the subject of  one of  
Carlos’ translated texts. By a huge historical 
irony, this move to ward off  Christian objec-
tions finished up 800 years later in the 13th 
century by making Aristotle respectable for 
Christianity. In being presented as agreeing 
with Plato, Aristotle had come to seem to be in 
agreement with Christianity. Again and again, it 
is impossible to understand the later history of  
Western philosophy, and its use of  Aristotle, 
unless one is aware of  the transformation that 
Aristotle underwent at the hands of  the late 
Greek Neoplatonists on whom Carlos is such 
a leading expert.
The devout Proclus was rather a thorn in 
the flesh of  the Christians, with his ‘holier than 
thou’ attitude. In old age, he would go wading 
in the sea in winter, to ensure his purity, and he 
strenuously denied Christian doctrines on the 
creation of  the world. One of  the first things I 
read, to my own enlightenment and profit, by 
Carlos was about Proclus’ anti-Christian views 
on the infinite duration of  motion in the physi-
cal universe, and about its calling for a divine 
mover of  infinite power. Proclus was actually 
rude about Aristotle when he thought he did 
not agree with Plato, as Carlos has himself  
brought out more than anyone. It was Proclus’ 
pupil Ammonius who was the diplomat. In the 
different city of  Alexandria, he persuaded the 
Christian authorities to keep the Neoplatonist 
school open and it lasted nearly a century 
after the Athenian teaching school had been 
closed. I believe Ammonius agreed to exclude 
Neoplatonist ritual from his classes – no os-
tentatious sea bathing for him.
Perhaps Carlos has in him some of  the 
best of  Proclus and Ammonius. Like Proclus, 
he can be stern about rigour. The first time he 
helped me, it was to correct the translations 
of  a justly admired senior Oxford scholar of  
Aristotle. This scholar had warned me that he 
was not interested in Neoplatonism, but only in 
Aristotle. He was willing to make translations 
for me of  the Neoplatonist commentaries on 
Aristotle, but only on those terms, and I could 
take it or leave it. I took it, and the translations 
were excellent so long as the text confined itself  
to expounding Aristotle. But where the com-
mentary moved to incorporating Neoplatonist 
ideas, Carlos covered the translation of  our 
distinguished colleague with red ink. Not only 
did the colleague take it very well, but he be-
came converted to an enthusiastic interest in 
Neoplatonism. I think that many of  Carlos’ 
pupils can testify that his stern and outspoken 
insistence on rigour and understanding has 
been of  immeasurable benefit to them. 
But there is another side to Carlos, the 
Ammonian side. It is Carlos who has kept the 
study of  this great subject in Leuven safe for 
the future, despite the financial recession and 
the violent cuts to university services that we 
see threatened in Europe and America. It is 
no mystery to me why the President of  the 
European Union, Herman van Rompey, has 
honoured us with his presence today, and 
it is not only because he is an alumnus of  
this University. I am irresistibly reminded of  
Ammonius’ agreement with the city fathers 
of  Alexandria at another time of  danger. It 
is Carlos’ skill in diplomacy, like the skill of  
Ammonius before him, that above all secures 
the study of  his subject in this great university, 
as he secured it once before at a time of  un-
certainty.
I am very happy that the two people are 
here today who have done most to make Carlos’ 
great achievements possible, his mother and his 
wife Anne.
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Thinking life: religion, 
philosophy, and art. 
An interview with Paul Cruysberghs
On October 28th and 29th, 2010, colleagues and friends 
of Paul Cruysberghs organised a congress on the occasion 
of his emeritate. They came from Leuven, Kortrijk, and 
abroad to celebrate the academic career of this noticed 
Hegelian and Kierkegaardian scholar. On the next day, 
Prof. Cruysberghs delivered his valedictory lecture on 
Thinking life: religion, philosophy, and art. 
Shortly after this event, he gave an interview to one of 
his doctoral students. We are happy to publish it in this 
Alumni Newsletter. 
Philosophical Influences
I came across philosophy when I was still in 
school and my interest in such a subject was 
sparked by questions such as the existence of  
God: I started looking in encyclopedias and 
dictionaries in the teachers’ library, where 
sometimes we were allowed to look around. I 
remember that I was telling the other students 
that we could not know whether God existed or 
not. When one of  our spiritual leaders came to 
know this he told me: “that’s an old position, 
it is a Kantian position, it’s not important any-
more” but I felt proud that I shared a position 
with Kant! So, my philosophical interest started 
with religious questions. Later on I came across 
some books of  Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and 
the Discourse on Method by Descartes. But when 
I entered the seminary, after finishing high-
school, the bishop said that Philosophy was 
not good for me, and they needed a classical 
philologist, so I started Classical Philology 
and, like most of  the people in the seminary, 
I combined it with Philosophy. But as soon 
as I was free, that is, when I left the seminar, I 
dropped Classical Philology, which seemed too 
narrow. I felt that the approach of  Philosophy 
in general, as well as that of  the professors at 
the Institute, was much broader.
What attracted me in Kierkegaard was the 
definite link between philosophy and life. What 
I learned about philosophy before going to 
university was really at the level of  metaphysics 
and its relation to theology. What I was look-
ing for instead was a kind of  elucidation of  the 
meaning of  life, a reflection closer to human 
existence, and I had the impression that I found 
this in Kierkegaard. Later on, when I discovered 
Hegel, what struck me in his thought was the 
fact that there you have an architectural view 
of  the world, and of  life as well. A systematic 
thinker like Hegel was able to show that dif-
ferent dimensions of  life and society had a 
place on their own, and at the same time they 
were connected with other dimensions. I was 
interested in that because that is the elucidating 
dimension of  philosophy, which  clarifies what 
is specific about certain things and teaches us 
not to mix up everything, bringing together for 
example religion and philosophy, or politics 
and art. These dimensions have a place of  their 
own, and at the same time they are not isolated 
from each other. From that moment I had the 
impression I became more an Hegelian than a 
Kierkegaardian. Yet, when I read Kierkegaard, I 
had the feeling that Kierkegaard was providing 
me with that bad conscience that is missing 
in an Hegelian perspective, where everything 
seems to have its place. The Kierkegaardian 
perspective helps you to be suspicious of  eve-
rything you have in your life, and especially it 
teaches you not to trust yourself  and your own 
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convictions. In general I have the impression 
that when dealing with philosophy, both per-
spectives are important for me: on one hand 
the dimension of  clarification, and on the other 
the dimension of  suspicion, that is, a more 
skeptical position. That is why, when teaching 
“Philosophical Anthropology” to second year 
students, in contrast to my colleagues who in 
the first year told them that the purpose of  
philosophy was to clarify things, I used to tell 
them that my intention was to generate confu-
sion. In general, I think that the purpose of  
philosophy in society is to warn against taking 
things in an overly-simplistic way, it is to show 
people that matters are much more compli-
cated than they believe. If  you want to fight 
against simplifications, then you have to start 
by confusing people. Not only Kierkegaard but 
also Hegel is doing that: showing that things 
shouldn’t be taken in a merely one-sided way. 
One of  my motivations as a philosopher has 
been that of  showing the complex dimensions 
of  life.
The three stages
There is a joke among students that I went 
through the three Kierkegaardian stages in re-
verse: the religious, the ethical, and finally the 
aesthetic. There is some truth in this joke when 
it comes to my own career. It started with re-
ligious questions, and many of  the discussions 
I participated in were about religion, yet in a 
quite critical manner. I have the impression that 
at some point these questions were put to rest 
thanks to the Hegelian perspective, although 
I still have hesitations about its excessive ra-
tionalism. According to Hegel, it is no longer 
possible to experience religion in an immediate 
way and somehow we need a more conceptual 
perspective. Immediate religious representa-
tions or symbols can no longer function in 
modernity. The Hegelian perspective argues for 
a sublation of  the religious, which can have its 
own place and should be respected, but at the 
same time it is not enough for an intellectual, 
i.e. we need a conceptual perspective. Looking 
at Kierkegaard, I always have problems with 
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that paradoxical perspective. It interests me as 
an issue but I could never be able to live in that 
perspective.
My doctoral thesis was about ethics and 
more specifically about politics. When talking 
about ethics, my early interest was a political 
one, which I learnt from Hegel. From a bio-
graphical point of  view, when I started working 
in the Kortrijk campus, I took part in a circle 
in which people discussed different things. It 
started as an ecumenical circle, where we dis-
cussed with local Protestants. But soon it made 
a transition from religion to politics and to the 
necessity of  secularizing religion. We ended 
up by agreeing that the true content at which 
religion aims is politics. We started by reading 
Bultmann and we ended up reading Althusser 
and other French Marxist political thinkers. 
Things went wrong when we decided to be 
active in politics and at that point we realized 
that we were only ‘intellectuals’ and not ‘doers.’
I have been interested in aesthetics from the 
very beginning, although I started teaching it 
only later in my career. I remember that as a 
child I collected pictures of  artworks and I was 
interested in literature and especially poetry. I 
was happy that at a certain moment I got the 
opportunity to teach what I was interested in, 
that is, aesthetics. 
Reflecting from an Hegelian perspective, 
we should be careful about the way we take the 
Hegelian statement that modernity means the 
end of  art. Hegel meant in the first place the 
death of  a specific kind of  art, i.e. religious art. 
What Hegel seems to say is that the artistic 
perspective of  expressing what is meaningful in 
life has lost its cultural importance. There was 
a time when religion pervaded all of  society 
and life. After religion lost that place, and after 
having been deceived by politics, the romantics 
hoped that art would take over, as for example 
in a new mythology that would bring people 
together. And in this respect I think that Hegel 
is right: this hope does not function either. If  
you look around you see that art has been one 
specific system within culture, it is just a topos 
amongst other topoi. In a certain sense, I am 
tempted to say that politics is more encom-
passing that art. Yet art has its truth in the fact 
that it is a place where meaning is produced, or 
shown, in a very fragmentary way, which, how-
ever, is the only way possible in society. Any at-
tempt to bring about a unitary view is destined 
either not to function or to function wrongly. 
You get ideologies imposing themselves, and 
this is simply dangerous. Philosophical per-
spectives that want to present a unitary system 
have also become irrelevant. Art, instead, can be 
relevant but we have to keep in mind that art 
is ‘polytheistic’, i.e. art is presenting all kinds 
of  gods, both the ideal ones and the bad ones, 
but in this way it is confronting us with life. 
If  there is a place today where there is room 
for reflection it is thanks to art. But you also 
need to be mindful of  the fact that different 
populations have different appreciations of  art 
and we cannot put faith in a canon that would 
be appreciated equally all over the world by all 
people in all kinds of  social situations. This 
means that you have to live with that plurality 
of  forms and fragmentation. In this sense, I 
agree with Hegel that you need a philosophy 
that does more but at the same time you have 
to admit that philosophy has also become a 
topos amongst others and we all realize that the 
idea of  influencing people or unifying them in 
a common philosophical system does not work.
The years at the Institute 
During my student years at the Institute of  
Philosophy many of  our professors, as well 
as many of  the students, were priests, which 
means that they were older. Because of  this, 
there existed a more mature relation between 
students and professors than what is going on 
now: we were taken seriously by our profes-
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sors. I was one of  the youngest but I have the 
impression that I profited from this. Despite 
the fact that the Institute was supposed to 
be a Thomistic school, Thomas was absent 
at that moment. The dominant trend was 
Existentialism, and especially an existential 
reading of  Heidegger. The first part of  Sein und 
Zeit was read in an anthropological way. Later 
on I moved to Kortrijk, where we had a good 
group of  people working on German Idealism, 
Ethics, and Political Philosophy. When the 
Institute of  Philosophy became a separate fac-
ulty, in Kortrijk too we decided to become a 
sub-faculty of  our own, and from that moment 
I started having again more contact with the 
Institute, being part of  the board as representa-
tive of  Kortrijk and doing some teaching there. 
In the last years, when I fully returned to the 
Institute, I had the impression of  finally find-
ing my place. 
Working in Kortrijk was very satisfying: phi-
losophy had an important place because those 
who taught it meant something to the campus, 
thanks to their teaching and the initiatives they 
took, organizing lectures in the university and 
in town, and other interesting things. Once, for 
example, I organized a fashion show together 
with a philosophy lecture! Slowly, though, it 
became more difficult for students to combine 
philosophy with other courses of  study until 
it was finally decided that philosophy would 
stop. Returning to Leuven was something of  
a homecoming. Finally, this was a place where 
I could do more substantial things than I did 
before. I also started having doctoral students 
and that was very important.
Being the student dean in Kortrijk meant 
a lot of  things. At some point, together with 
the student’s Parish priest, I even started rent-
ing houses from the private market for the 
students in Kortrijk. The owners were very 
reticent about renting to students because there 
was no such tradition, and they expected them 
to sign three-year contracts. So we decided to 
step in. At some point we had rented up to 
ten old houses. Students invited us for dinner 
and I had a very good relationship with them. 
I also had lots of  contact even with students 
who had financial and psychological trouble. 
That was a bit like a form of  social work. In 
Leuven it never happened in the same way, but 
still I was the one joining students each year 
when they organized their student trips. For me 
the difference of  status between students and 
professors is not important, you just have more 
intellectual experience and you communicate 
that when you teach, but I was never interested 
in keeping a distance.
The future
I am not afraid of  the black hole that many 
professors dread after retirement. I have the 
feeling that since my retirement not much has 
changed. The teaching has almost gone but 
the work still goes on. This has to do with 
the fact that I still have a number of  doctoral 
students. Besides, I will keep my links with 
the Kierkegaard Research Centre and with the 
Hegel Gesellschaft. And also in the artistic 
world things will continue and further develop. 
We are translating Kierkegaard from Danish to 
Dutch and that project will go on. Even though 
I have to admit that I am better at making ex-
planatory footnotes than translating! 
I am going to teach in Tanzania in a semi-
nary for a few months starting from February 
2011. One of  my former doctoral students, 
Father Thomas Kochulamchuvattil, is an Indian 
missionary priest in Tanzania. He has worked 
on Kierkegaard and African philosophy. Now 
he’s starting up a new university in Arusha and 
he has asked me to help and cooperate. This 
means that I am going to start doing some 
teaching this year, specifically, the History 
of  Modern Philosophy. The idea is that of  
establishing a university for all of  Africa, not 
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only for the surrounding area of  Arusha and 
the Kilimanjaro region. Students are already 
coming from almost everywhere, and my wife 
is joining me there to teach French.
I think that foreign students in general are 
very important for the Institute. I still have the 
feeling that we have the tendency to consider 
the Dutch-speaking students as our privileged 
students, but personally I would try to focus 
more on the foreign students. I think we can 
do more for them and attract more students. 
As far as developing countries are concerned, 
I think we shouldn’t underestimate in the first 
place the cultural gap. I ask myself  the ques-
tion: how am I going to teach the history of  
modern philosophy to people who belong to 
a different culture. Maybe the situation will 
not be that different from the generation gap 
I experience with our Dutch-speaking students 
here. In comparison with 30 years ago, what 
people know, their general culture, is quite 
different from what we knew as students. 
Perhaps students from developing countries 
today know more about religion as a general 
background than our Dutch-speaking students 
today. Anyway, I have the feeling that I have to 
explain much more now than I did before. 
Today I would not qualify the Institute 
of  philosophy as ‘Catholic,’ but it is clear that 
religious questions are still at the core of  our 
interests. If  you take into consideration that 
many of  our foreign students are coming from 
Catholic universities or institutions, then there 
is an evident religious link, namely Catholicism. 
This may of  course change, because at the 
Institute the situation may become different, 
and perhaps even in the areas where the stu-
dents are coming from, such as Africa, Asia, etc. 
For the moment I think that religion is still the 
tie that binds, which might be a good basis for 
cooperation, but in the future we may have to 
reconsider everything. Maybe the future will be 
in the direction of  socio-political philosophy 
and our incoming students from developing 
countries will become increasingly interested 
in those questions rather than in questions of  
metaphysics, ontology, etc. This means that we 
need to reflect on our own future and on what 
kind of  students we are interested in attracting. 
Interview by Margherita Tonon
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irony, uncanniness and 
Getting un-stuck
A Dialogue with Jonathan Lear
First, to frame the situation. Professor Jonathan Lear, 
from the University of Chicago, had been invited by K.U. 
Leuven to be the Cardinal Mercier Lecturer for that week 
and had already given two seminar courses on irony. He 
was preparing to give the main lecture that evening, just 
after our meeting. It was a typical Belgian afternoon, 
filled with gray skies and rain. We met at the recently 
smokeless Erasmus bar, located directly across from the 
Institute of Philosophy. We spoke for around 40 min-
utes about various topics related to his current work. He 
discussed the relationship between philosophy and psychoa-
nalysis, how they are one, his current research into irony 
as it appears in Plato, Kierkegaard and psychoanalysis, his 
silence concerning metaphysics, and the aims for effective 
psychoanalysis (Lear is himself an analyst, working in 
Chicago). My own knowledge of Professor Lear’s work 
came solely from his lectures, which is why I confined 
myself to questions that arose for me after attending these 
lectures, rather than trying to get him to say what he has 
already said elsewhere. The questions were rather specific, 
but Professor Lear was generous in his responses so as to 
branch out into general concerns as well. What follows is 
the transcription of our dialogue. 
The first question is a broad question concerning the rela-
tion that you see between psychoanalysis and philosophy. 
What precisely is this interaction and is it possible for 
philosophy to provide a similar environment for the de-
velopment of irony that you see happening in an effective 
analysis, as you have described this week?
There may be various ways that one can con-
ceptualize what philosophy is and, related to 
that, there are different ways one can think 
about how or where to begin in philosophy. 
This is a tremendously important question. A 
huge influence on me is Socrates, as I under-
stand him as emerging out of  the Platonic dia-
logues. The fundamental question that Socrates 
poses, a question that each person puts in the 
first person to him or herself  is: how ought I 
live? It is a practical question. There has been 
a tendency to read that as a theoretic question 
about the nature of  the human, but I take it as 
essentially a practical question as to how do I 
develop or look after my soul so that I can live 
a good life.
Now, if  that’s an adequate starting point 
for philosophy, you can’t answer that question 
without taking the human psyche seriously. So, 
the presumption that there are two disciplines, 
philosophy on the one hand and psychology on 
the other, and then the question of  combining 
them, is ultimately a false question. This pre-
supposes divisions I don’t accept. The issue of  
the nature of  the human psyche arises internal-
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ly to the fundamental question of  philosophy 
of  how do I live. So, for me there is only one 
question. It’s not how to combine them, but a 
question of  seeing how they became to seem 
separate, which is itself  an interesting social, 
historical question. 
I think that Socrates especially of  the 
Republic, but also as you see it in questions in 
the Phaedrus and Symposium, works out a very 
deep, sophisticated human psychology. I think 
the arguments there are very deep and basically 
persuasive. The way he divides the soul into 
a tripartite structure and how that influences 
personality formation, I find very persuasive. 
He himself  says he’s taking a shortcut for the 
purposes of  the discussion, but the structure 
is in the service of  a philosophical-practical 
question: why think that the just life is a happy 
or good life to live as opposed to a mistake, in 
the sense that you’d be better off  living unjustly 
if  you could get away with it (Thrasymachus’ 
challenge)? And so, the psychology emerges 
internally to an attempt to answer this philo-
sophical question. I think this is a right way to 
think. And then, it turns out, as Freud himself  
more or less understood, psychoanalysis is a 
development of  this basic insight and struc-
ture. He adds more to it, but I see Freud, and 
I think he saw himself, as basically working 
within the Platonic tradition. I mean, he’s not 
self-consciously trying to be a philosopher, al-
though I think his work has great philosophical 
significance. But the few times he comments, 
he says that what he means by Eros is just, as 
he puts it, ‘what the divine Plato meant in the 
Symposium’. Now, how deep a student he was of  
that, I don’t pretend to know. But I think that 
however much he thought about it he was right, 
he was working within the Platonic tradition 
in thinking about these issues. So, my view is 
that when I’m studying psychoanalysis I’m not 
studying something different than Plato, or not 
doing something for which there is then a ques-
tion of  how it relates to another discipline. It’s 
more, what is the philosophical significance of  
this definitely philosophical material. 
So they end up being two ways of studying this question?
They don’t end up that way, but instead that is 
how they start out. They start out by present-
ing themselves as two aspects of  something. 
The incorrect starting point is thinking they 
are two different subject matters and then how 
do we relate them. The correct starting point is 
to think that here are two different aspects or 
guises of  an activity of  reflection that we have 
really good reason to think are one. The ques-
tion, then, is what we do about that. The aim is 
partly to try and see how this does and doesn’t 
fit together.
The second question is more specifically related to irony. 
When one can cultivate what you call an ‘ironic exist-
ence’ by successfully asking the question, for example, for 
philosophers, ‘what does doing philosophy have to do with 
doing philosophy?’, is the irony of the repetition that is in-
volved here one that entails a leap towards a universal that 
no longer fits into general laws? For example, the second 
‘doing philosophy’ here is not a particular occurrence, as 
you said not to view it in Aristotelian terms, but could 
it suggest a new universal that cannot be reduced to the 
first occurrence?
I’m going to try to talk more about this very 
thing today. What I was trying to talk about 
primarily in the first seminar, the ‘experience 
of  irony’, is a disruptive experience with respect 
to an identity and an ideal. I wanted to isolate 
the specific nature of  ironic experience, I called 
this ‘would-be directed uncanniness’ or ‘erotic 
uncanniness’. And that’s a crucial experience to 
understand what ironic existence is. But ironic 
existence is not just that experience, nor just 
the capacity to induce such an experience, but, 
what I think it is, and Kierkegaard thought of  
it as a human excellence, a virtue. So it’s the 
development of  a capacity of  soul so that the 
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one who has it can deploy it well in the right 
sort of  way at the right time as a form of  
human flourishing. And what does that look 
like? I think, well I think Kierkegaard thought, 
and I think he’s right, that it looks a lot like 
Socrates. Socrates was able to develop a capac-
ity of  soul, to deploy a capacity for irony, in 
the right sort of  way at the right time, making 
good use of  it. How would you describe that? 
The way Kierkegaard describes this is as igno-
rance. This isn’t about leaps. I think the issue 
in Kierkegaard is very complicated because I 
think that, at least some of  the time, he uses 
the expression of  the leap to ironize it, to make 
fun of  it. I think he was very busy, some of  the 
time, making fun of  his colleagues who talked 
about leaps. It’s not that I don’t think he means 
something in earnest about the leap, but I think 
he was worried about phrases like that becom-
ing a cliché and being traded around by people 
who think of  themselves as philosophers but 
who were basically exchanging clichés. Also, 
one has to be careful because (in general I 
think this is true) almost all of  the discussion 
of  leaps, if  not the whole discussion, is carried 
out by pseudonymous authors. You read about 
it in Fear and Trembling, but that was not written 
by Kierkegaard it was written by Johannes de 
Silentio, and it is written about in great length 
in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. But again, 
that’s not by Kierkegaard, it’s by Johannes 
Climacus. Kierkegaard, in his own name, says, 
in this essay called Towards an Understanding with 
my Reader, that his use of  pseudonyms was 
not just a pen-name. He created authors who 
were expressing points of  view. So, what’s the 
relationship between anything a pseudonymous 
author says and what Kierkegaard thinks? Who 
knows, I mean that would be a very open and 
debatable question. In Towards an Understanding 
with my Reader, he says in his own name, and I 
can pretty much quote this, that it is his wish, 
no his prayer, that if  ever these works will be 
cited they will be done in the name of  the 
pseudonymous author and not in his name. 
So I think one has to take with a great grain 
of  salt any discussion of  the leap of  faith in 
Kierkegaard’s point of  view. It’s not that we 
can’t give meaning to that or that we can’t as-
cribe some meaning of  that to Kierkegaard, but 
it’s a terribly fraught issue of  interpretation, 
and a deep philosophical and theological ques-
tion of  what that might mean for that to come 
out of  his mouth sincerely. 
But what you get from the experience of  
irony that I was trying to describe, I want to 
describe the experience internal to the experi-
ence, the phenomenology of  it, which is the 
phenomenology of  uncanny disruption. Now, 
what the metaphysics of  that entails is another 
question and about that I’d like to remain si-
lent. 
Well, this next question touches on that. In some of your 
other work, you’ve talked about moving away from nar-
ratives of progress or a directionality to life, implying that 
life carries with it its own means for disruption. So, there 
are two questions. Is the idea of hope that you are talking 
about a return to transcendence as the possibility for giv-
ing order amidst disruption? And, secondly, does this hope 
in a future good, or the suspicion that life is good, signal 
a return to Platonic metaphysics in which a transcendent 
value guides us?
There are a number of  things that you raise. 
Firstly, I don’t think I really yet understand 
what Plato’s metaphysics is and I’m suspicious 
of  assumptions that we do know what it is. 
Not that I think that nobody understands it, 
but I’d like to meet the person who does and 
I’d like to sit down and learn from him or her. 
I’m suspicious of  assuming that we already 
know what Plato’s metaphysics is and then it’s 
a question of  knowing how my beliefs fit or 
don’t fit with that. My first reaction is, I wish 
I knew better. 
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Could it be said, broadly, that everything has a place with 
being or an order of existence?
Again, I’d have to know what each of  those 
phrases mean. I worry about the danger of  
philosophy turning into cliché. But, secondly, 
let me try to answer your question this way. 
I’m trying to find or contemplate experiences 
within life that, from the experience itself, you 
can see that it has some philosophical signifi-
cance. Maybe we might not be able to say fully 
what it is, but we can start. That’s one reason 
why I find psychoanalysis interesting, because 
human life is much richer and more suggestive 
philosophically than it’s normally taken to be 
and this shows up in all sorts of  ways in the 
psychoanalytic situation. But you raise the issue 
of  hope and the place where it came up in my 
writing was around a concrete human experi-
ence. I used my philosophical imagination to 
work with it, but in the first instance what I 
was trying to explore was a kind of  collapse of  
the structure of  a culture and what the ethical 
implications of  that are for an inhabitant of  
that culture. My book Radical Hope is a philo-
sophical mediation on, ‘what would it be to be 
an inhabitant of  a culture that is itself  falling 
apart, or being destroyed by an external cul-
ture, with the traditional way of  life becoming 
impossible?’ That has consequences in anthro-
pology or the social sciences, in terms of  how 
an overrun people adapts to an overwhelming 
force, a colonial power, or whatever the issue 
is. But what I was interested in philosophically 
was that this has conceptual implications in 
that the fundamental concepts of  the culture 
come under threat. So, for instance, in working 
with the Crow Indians [an Indian tribe of  the 
northwestern plains of  North America (JS)] 
where I’ve been working, and where I continue 
to work, their traditional concept of  courage 
became unlivable. There’s no longer a way to 
go on a hunt and go into a fight with other 
Indian tribes as this was just shut down. So my 
interest was what happens to the concept of  
courage. This is theoretically interesting, but 
this is a fundamentally ethical question: if  I 
have thought of  myself  as being a courageous 
person and courage has mattered to me as a way 
of  being, what am I to do now? What I face, in 
the first person, is a breakdown, not just in the 
way of  life, but in the intelligibility of  the way 
of  life. I don’t know how to take a step forward 
as a courageous person. 
So, secondly, the issue of  hope again comes 
up internal to this experience. There could be 
many responses to this, for example despair. 
But, I took chief  Plenty Coups as an exemplar 
of  somebody who’s maintaining hopefulness 
across this disaster and then asked the question 
of  what’s to be said in favor of  that. I mean, 
I’ve asked two things: what does that hopeful-
ness consist in and what is to be said in favor 
of  it? Again, I’m trying to get the experience 
from the inside, rather than positing a meta-
physics that I know or don’t know. My strategy 
is to say: if  we just take the hopefulness as a 
response, as there, what does that consist in? 
As I understood it, the hopefulness consists in 
a recognition of  the finitude of  my particular 
culture’s way of  understanding what courage 
consists in. So, instead of  thinking ‘that’s it for 
courage’, even though I don’t know how to go 
on now, the hopefulness is itself  a manifesta-
tion of  the recognition that the tradition I grew 
up with is one finite understanding of  that, 
but there might be another that I can inhabit 
or that others can inhabit. In that sense, it is a 
manifestation internal to the experience. It is a 
commitment to the idea that whatever is to be 
said in favor of  courage, whatever is good about 
it, or, more broadly, whatever is good about life, 
is not exhausted by my culture’s finite under-
standing. So even in the catastrophe that I’ve 
described there is a form of  hopefulness which 
is itself  a manifestation of  the idea that the 
goodness of  life transcends my culture’s practi-
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cal understanding of  what it’s been. Now, what 
is the metaphysics of  that? I don’t know.
It certainly points to a heavy claim that there’s a something 
transcending the human.
That’s right, that’s right. It’s a heavy human 
claim. But I like to start from the experience it-
self  and ask internal to that what I’m commit-
ted to. It’s worth mentioning, since we’re here 
[in Leuven (JS)], that Plenty Coups himself  
converted to Catholicism. He gave up the obvi-
ous life of  the Crow, but he kept identifying as 
a Crow even after he converted. I’ve been to the 
church in which he converted. The Catholics I 
know on the reservation feel that you can be 
both Catholic and adhere to what they call the 
Crow Way, which are the post-reservation tradi-
tions of  Crow life. So, doing both.
The last question specifically relates to irony and psychoa-
nalysis and is a clarification on some things you said in 
the lecture. You said that one goal of the analytic process is 
to allow for a new psychic unity, albeit an unconsciously 
motivated one, to come to the surface, and this is linked to 
what can be good for the analysand. So I was wonder-
ing about the nature of this unity. Is the unity a matter 
of redirecting someone towards something that is good in 
order to help bring order to their life? Or is it a matter 
of strengthening them to express something that is possibly 
suffocating them? 
Well, I’m not sure I understand your question, 
but I think it could be both. I made a number 
of  points yesterday, but one was that the un-
conscious as I understand it, though not for 
absolutely everybody, but in terms of  the range 
of  what psychoanalysts call high functioning, 
but neurotic people, which is a wide swathe of  
people you meet at university, the unconscious 
is mistakenly viewed as all these separate atomic 
wishes that are pushed away. You have a wish to 
do some forbidden thing and then another and 
then you repressed it because it seemed so hor-
rible. I mean, that doesn’t seem the way it is, as 
far as I can see. It’s not that there’s no truth in 
these pictures, but there’s another fundamental 
truth. In analysis what emerges are these rich, 
dense, complicated structures of  meaning and 
there’s something about that structure that is 
not understood. There may be lots of  parts of  
it that you are very much aware of, but what 
you aren’t aware of  is how it all fits together. 
There’s a reason you aren’t aware of  that. One 
claim is that you are motivated not to be aware 
of  how it fits together, because you experience 
there being some kind of  conflict with your 
own conscious sense of  who you are, what your 
identity is, and what matters to you. So that’s 
one claim. 
The second claim is that leaving things just 
like that is always going to be an unhappy mak-
ing problem that gets in the way of  a full, rich 
and flourishing life because this stuff  is going 
to keep intruding. Often the conflict will be 
a source of  suffering, unhappiness, repetition, 
and getting stuck in life. So, the third claim, 
then, is that the aim in psychoanalysis in these 
cases is to allow for a better solution to the 
problem of  this conflict. It doesn’t make it go 
away, it’s not just a cure. And that’s why I think 
it’s important not to be seduced by false images 
of  unity. Unity is important for us, not because 
we have it as one value among others, but in-
ternal to human life the experience of  disunity 
is disruptive, it’s unpleasant, it’s something we 
don’t like and makes us unhappy. Certainly this 
is the experience of  being stuck, not moving, 
developing, and a lack of  freedom. I think that 
when psychoanalysis is going well it facilitates 
better ways of  living with these disruptions, 
partly by modifying them. So the unity that is 
genuinely available to humans is itself  partially 
constituted by disruption. My view is not that 
we have this unity and then it gets disrupted, 
but that the unity itself  is constituted in part 
by disruption. So it’s a unity if  you learn how 
to live with it well. It’s more like the difference 
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between the painful disruption of  a piece of  
music versus the capacity to play jazz and im-
provise well and make music as you go along. 
That may be a bad metaphor, but it comes to 
mind as trying to encourage a creative, poetic 
use of  this disruptive capacity as opposed to 
suffering or being stuck by it. So, to work this 
out well, I think, would be to work out what 
human freedom consists in. 
On that last note, is there a risk that this kind of disrup-
tion can be tragic or lead to a tragic experience? 
Well, there are risks to life. 
Well, yes. But coming to grips with these things or seeing 
them is not comfortable.
That’s right. I agree with that, but usually peo-
ple who come to analysis are not comfortable. 
By and large, people come there because they 
are in genuine pain and are suffering and the 
hope is that analysis provides them the environ-
ment in which to understand their repetition. 
Are their risks involved? Yes, but what is the 
alternative? From my point of  view you see 
people, typical at the university, who have terri-
ble problems writing papers or finishing them. 
For a while they thought it was because of  their 
high standards but these standards get in the 
way of  them doing anything, of  passing classes, 
and they start to get exhausted with themselves. 
They get fed up. Over and over and over again 
it’s the same problem. They experience them-
selves as being stuck, although they don’t know 
why, and it’s a source of  great pain. Or with 
break-ups. You don’t usually see a patient after 
they’ve broken up with their first girlfriend or 
boyfriend, you see them after their fourth one, 
for example. After the repetition. They don’t 
really get it because they think they’ve done 
it differently each time and they don’t see the 
repetition. They think they’ve been with differ-
ent kinds of  people, that they’ve changed, and 
yet there’s something haunting and exhausting 
about the break-up. People come in sort of  
tired, sick of  themselves, angry, fed up, but 
panicky, wondering if  this is it in life. Will it 
be like this forever? Between me and the grave, 
is there going to be a series of  failed relation-
ships? That’s what brings people in. That’s a 
classic way of  coming in and the question is 
whether analysis can provide a safe enough 
environment whereby this can be explored in 
a way that can allow for changes, allowing the 
person to get unstuck.
OK, that’s good. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Interview by Jonathan Sholl
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A talk with Jerrold Levinson
Holder of the International Francqui Chair 2010-2011 
As part of the International Francqui Chair, you are 
delivering a series of ten lectures at the Institute of 
Philosophy, in which you range over the whole field of the 
philosophy of music: you discuss matters ranging from the 
value of music, the ontological status of the musical work, 
and the problem of emotions in music, to technical question 
about musical form and musical apprehension, as well as 
many more. Do you have any favorites among these topics?
Well, I don’t know if  I have favorites. As you 
say, it’s a series of  lectures on the philosophy of  
music, from an analytic, Anglo-American angle. 
At the outset there’s the issue of  the three pri-
mary roles in relation to music, and some of  
the lectures focus on how music looks from 
those three perspectives: creation (compos-
ing/improvising), interpretation (performing/
executing), and reception (listening/criticiz-
ing). Then we turned to the issue of  what 
music means or communicates, and the role 
of  perceived musical movement and musical 
gesture in all that. Music clearly relates to emo-
tions, both through embodying or expressing 
them and through producing or evoking them 
or imaginary versions of  them. These issues 
and several others are addressed in the readings 
posted on the website for the course. 
In the lecture this evening I’m going to talk 
about something that is closer to musical analy-
sis than musical philosophy: the idea of  musi-
cal form and the different kinds of  musical 
form. But that’s to set the stage for an issue I’m 
particularly interested in, the focus of  my only 
monograph, Music in the Moment, namely this: 
What kind of  form really matters to us when 
we listen to music? What kind of  form directly 
makes music better? What kind of  form is ap-
preciatively relevant? Those are questions I’ll 
take up in my penultimate lecture. 
My ultimate lecture for the series is on 
the topic of  song, which is generally seen as a 
somewhat special case. Not all theorists think 
that way, though; for instance, there is a British 
aesthetician named Aaron Ridley who does not 
go along with the usual practice of  distinguish-
ing the cases of  instrumental music and vocal 
music as regards expressive content. But I do 
think it does make sense to treat them some-
what separately. That doesn’t mean that song 
isn’t music just as fully as a symphony is, and 
it also doesn’t prevent song from being perhaps 
the most primordial or basic sort of  music, the 
origins of  which are lost in prehistory. But the-
oretically it seems clear that the issues of  what 
music can do, what it can mean, and how it can 
affect us, are different depending on whether or 
not there is a text expressing articulate thoughts 
connected to the music. That’s why I find it 
useful to consider them separately. So in that 
ultimate lecture I will talk about song, and 
how in song music and words somehow work 
together, to the greater glory of  both, focusing 
on songs from Great American Song Book (as it is 
often called).
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Are you including some musical examples in your lec-
tures?
Indeed I am, both live and recorded. Being 
fairly shameless, this evening I’ll play some in-
strumental selections on my alto recorder, and 
in the last class, I’ll sing a few songs or cho-
ruses thereof, either a capella or with recorded 
accompaniment. What works in the corridors 
of  the metro can also work in the classroom, 
you know! (Except that I don’t hold out a hat.) 
Of  course those musical examples will serve to 
illustrate properly philosophical points about 
song... 
Wonderful, this makes your lectures all-encompassing in 
the most literal sense! But, how do you see your own posi-
tion as a philosopher working on music?
My position contrasts with that of  some 
other notables, such as Peter Kivy, who has 
written more on our subject than any other 
Anglophone philosopher. But Kivy is more or 
less a formalist about musical content, while I 
am more liberal—or perhaps just more tender-
hearted?—about what music’s meaning, value, 
and human significance might be.  
You’re something of a musical democrat, then? 
As regards the accessibility of  music, even 
complicated music, to everyone, whether or not 
they have had musical training, yes. But some 
of  my views, particularly about musical value, 
or about better or worse in art more generally, 
have an elitist flavor to them.
You have become known, within the debate in analytic aes-
thetics, as a defender of an intentionalist, historicist, and 
contextualist view of art: does that make your intellectual 
position lean more towards Continental philosophy than 
those of other analytic aestheticians? Do you see yourself 
as someone who could build bridges between the analytic 
world and that of the old continent, especially now that 
you are teaching here? Perhaps your position, which takes 
into account intentional, historical, and contextual fac-
tors, lends itself better to be read and appreciated by 
Continental philosophers than the work of other analytic 
philosophical theorists?
Well, it would be nice if  I could serve as a kind 
of  bridge. I don’t know. There’s no mistaking 
that I represent my own, analytic philosophical 
tradition in the way I formulate, organize, and 
address the issues, but the claims that I make 
and defend about music are possibly more con-
genial to people of  the Continental tradition 
than the claims of  some other analytic phi-
losophers of  music, such as Peter Kivy, Stephen 
Davies, Malcolm Budd or Nick Zangwill. 
Whether I can serve as any kind of  bridge be-
tween the traditions is a matter of  whether vari-
ous views or intuitions about music that I share 
with more Continental thinkers can prevail over 
the evident difference in method and style.
Let me continue on the theme of  philo-
sophical bridgework, but in a more jocular 
vein, connecting that theme to my hobby of  
singing jazz standards: as it happens, almost all 
the great standards, like the ones I will mention 
in my seminar tonight, have an AABA form. 
Now what is the B in that form, also known 
as thirty-two-bar form? B is the bridge. And 
I confess that that’s what was really coming 
to my mind in thinking about your question: 
how I enjoy singing bridges perhaps more than 
building them! Although some bridges are 
rather hard to sing—for instance, the one in 
Ellington’s ‘Sophisticated Lady’—because they 
are harmonically remote from the preceding 
A-sections. 
Now that is material for a great paper: comparing your 
position in the philosophy of music to the bridge of a jazz 
standard!
Yes, all kinds of  bridges! Collingwood, when 
he talks about the ontology of  music, uses the 
example of  a bridge: What is a bridge, he asks? 
Is it a physical object or an abstract object? 
He says it’s perhaps both, because on the one 
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hand, the architect creates the bridge abstractly 
when he completes a blueprint of  the bridge, 
while on the other hand, until others realize the 
bridge concretely in metal and stone, it’s not 
a bridge one can use to cross a river. But the 
architect’s design could be multiply realized, in 
different places, on different rivers, at different 
times, thus making different concrete instances 
of  what is, in one sense, the same abstract 
bridge. Bridges offer a nice analogy that helps 
to illuminate the ontology of  the artwork in 
arts such as music or poetry, where the work 
can have many instances but is not identical 
with any of  them or with their totality. So in 
sum, at least three sorts of  bridges are relevant 
here: bridges between traditions, bridges in jazz 
standards, and river-spanning bridges. 
What about your singing outside of the classroom? Do you 
still perform occasionally as a singer?
Yes, as some of  my friends and colleagues 
know, my jazz singing hobby is going on about 
eight years now. A bad habit, perhaps, but hab-
its are hard to break! Anyway, I should take this 
opportunity to publicize the jazz combo of  
the American Society for Aesthetics, which is called, 
in what is for aestheticians an inside joke, 
‘Aesthetic Attitude’. It’s led by Philip Alperson, 
saxophonist extraordinaire, and features other ex-
cellent musicians, notably Gary Hagberg, who’s 
a world-class guitarist, and Casey Haskins, a 
solid and versatile drummer. Anyway, I get to 
sing with them when I’m at the annual meet-
ings. But one thing I particularly liked about 
Brussels when I lived there during 2008-2009 
is that there was a club in Ixelles, Sounds, which 
had a Singer’s Night twice a month, and at 
which I was a regular. Unfortunately the owner 
decided to call a halt to the Singers Nights 
about a year ago. So now I am sort of  at a loss 
as to where to indulge my hobby, inflicting my 
vocal stylings (as they say) on semi-unwilling 
and semi-unsuspecting audiences. 
So you’re a marooned crooner?
Yes, and thus I hope that one day Singer’s 
Nights will resurface somewhere in Brussels. If  
they do, you can be sure I’ll be there. 
A cry for help! Apart from that, you seem to like spend-
ing your time in Europe, but why exactly did you come 
to Leuven?
Well, I was offered an International Francqui 
Chair, which as you know is a very prestigious 
thing. 
It is. Before you, philosophers like Donald Davidson have 
held it.
Clearly it was an offer of  the godfather variety: 
that is, one I simply couldn’t refuse. :-)  No, 
seriously, I was very happy to come. For one, 
I already knew Belgium and was already fond 
of  the place. In 2006 I lived here for about 
two months, holding a Chaire Perelman at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), and gave 
a short course there on philosophy of  humour. 
(No joke!) Then I spent a year in Brussels two 
years ago while holding a Leverhulme Fellowship 
at the University of  Kent in Canterbury, during 
which time I took the Eurostar regularly to give 
seminars and lectures over there. Obviously it’s 
much easier this time out, living and working 
in the same country! 
As for my impression of  the K.U.L., it has 
been quite positive, an impression that was 
confirmed in Le Soir, where I read recently that 
the K.U.L. is considered the best university in 
Belgium. So I’m glad to be here. My colleagues 
are friendly, the staff  are very helpful, and the 
students seem bright and interested. Plus there’s 
no shortage of  beer, mussels, frites, and carbon-
nades flamandes—all pluses in my book!
Yesterday, our minister of education announced that 
university professors should work harder, like everybody 
else nowadays. You have published six or so books, some 
authored, some edited, and more than seventy articles. 
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Meanwhile, you deliver lectures and serve on doctoral 
juries all over the world. How do you combine all this 
with the demands of academic life and the busy schedule 
of teaching and seeing students?
In fact I am relatively lazy, so what your minis-
ter says is true about me, I should work harder! 
But I want to say that my colleagues here, by 
contrast, appear to work very hard. They have a 
large number of  students, meet up for tutorials 
and discussions with them on a regular basis, 
and seem very devoted to them. I don’t see how 
they have much time or energy to work on their 
own research. So they don’t need to work harder, 
I would say, they already work hard enough!
Let’s hope the minister will read this. Something different, 
if I may ask: how do you like the non-academic part of 
your life here in Belgium? Do the arts also play an im-
portant role in your leisure time?
I very much like living in Brussels, and I’m very 
well situated for transport, so I go to a lot of  
things at the drop of  a hat. What I like espe-
cially about Brussels is that there’s always enough 
to do, but there’s almost never too much to do. 
It’s not an overwhelming kind of  place. You can 
be paralyzed by having the choice of  too many 
things of  a diverting nature—a true embarras 
de richesse—as you sometimes are in a city like 
New York or Paris. And public transport in 
Brussels functions very well--I especially like 
the dense network of  trams--as does intercity 
train service across Belgium. (Don’t ask about 
the American train system; we hardly have one.) 
I’m a real dévoté of  the Cinematek; I see a 
lot of  films there, many old or obscure ones 
that you can’t see elsewhere. Brussels has a lot 
to offer in the visual arts too. For example, 
there’s a really good exhibition now of  Cranach 
and Dürer at the Bozar, and an interesting one 
of  Delvaux at the Musee d’Ixelles. An exhibi-
tion I have yet to get to, but which is reputed 
to be very good, is at the Wiels art center, and 
features the work of  Francis Alÿs, who I think 
is a Belgian artist. Though all I know about 
him, actually, is that he was in Mexico City and 
pushed a block of  ice through the streets as 
some sort of  performance piece!
Do you often go to concerts too? What kind of music do 
you prefer?
Of course I go to a lot of  concerts, ça va de 
soi! Mostly classical and jazz, as it happens, 
but I also like rock, blues, cabaret, gamelan 
music, electro-acoustic music, and even some 
rap. What I have something of  a deaf  spot for, 
I suppose, is garden-variety American country 
music; a little of  that goes a very long way with 
me, I have to say!
Can we expect a dance performance during one of your 
seminars as well?
I shouldn’t think so. I like to dance, in a party 
context, but ballroom dances like waltz and 
tango are rather beyond me, though I can fake 
salsa and cha-cha. I’m a better singer than I am 
a dancer, I suppose. 
Perhaps you will want to stay in Brussels after the 
International Francqui Chair? Do you have any plans 
to visit other countries once you leave Belgium, or will 
you return to your home university in Maryland, outside 
Washington D.C.?
I’m quite addicted to travel and there are sev-
eral countries in Europe that haven’t yet – are 
you listening out there? – issued me an academic 
invitation, but which I would be keen to visit. 
Hungary is one of  them, Poland another, 
Russia a third. Central and Eastern Europe 
interests me, evidently. As it happens I’ve been 
establishing connections in Italy of  late—the 
Società Italiana d’Estetica awarded me their biennial 
International Prize this year—which resulted 
in a visit to Siracuse last May and upcoming 
visits to Rome in January and Turin in April. A 
good opportunity for me to work on my Italian 
and perhaps one day bring it up to the level of  
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my French! And Prague, a city I find magical, 
I’ve been to twice, and will go again in April.
For the past four years my pattern has been 
a year at home, a year away, a year at home, a 
year away. But I don’t think that I will continue 
that pattern. Not that my home university 
strenuously objects, but I think that once I 
return I should stay in Maryland for the next 
two years anyway. Of  course, another stint in 
Belgium in the future is not to be excluded. 
Only what could they offer me next time? The 
Francqui Chair squared? 
Who knows! Anyway, it was a pleasure talking to you, 
thanks a lot, and success with your remaining lectures!
Interview by Marlies De Munck
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The Tutors Training 
Programme at the hiw
Due to the importance of  teaching experience 
in the International job-market, for many years 
it has been a tradition of  the International 
Programme to offer some teaching opportuni-
ties to PhD students. International PhD stu-
dents have the possibility of  teaching a semes-
ter-long seminar in the BA of  the International 
Programme. Such seminars remain the ultimate 
responsibility of  the faculty member who is the 
titularis of  the seminar in question, but doctoral 
students are fully in charge of  all the teaching 
and evaluating activities, including choosing the 
course content. Since the academic year 2008-
09 the Institute of  Philosophy has offered a 
“tutors training programme,” a series of  semi-
nars aimed at those PhD students with teaching 
duties in the BA Programme. The training pro-
gramme is organized in cooperation with the 
CED, the Centre of  Educational Development 
of  the K.U.Leuven.
The CED (in Dutch DUO) is a central 
unit that supports all the faculties of  the 
K.U.Leuven in their goal to ensure good qual-
ity of  education, in order to improve student 
learning. For the HIW in particular, the faculty 
makes a plan with CED at the start of  every 
academic year. This plan consists of  an inven-
tory of  educational themes and issues, which 
turn into a series of  educational initiatives. 
CED will support the faculty in realizing these 
initiatives. In particular, insofar as doctoral stu-
dents are concerned, CED supports the faculty 
of  philosophy in organizing the training pro-
gramme for the International doctoral students 
who teach seminars in various subjects in the 
Bachelor of  Philosophy of  the International 
programme. The training programme is always 
carried out in close cooperation with an in-
ternal partner, specifically, an assistant of  the 
International Programme at the HIW.
Every year the International Programme tu-
tors teach core-curriculum courses such as the 
Research and Writing Tutorial, and seminars 
in the different historical and fundamental 
areas of  philosophy. Some of  these seminars, 
such as Modern Philosophy and Theory of  
Knowledge, are offered every year, while oth-
ers, such as Ancient Philosophy, Medieval 
Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, 
Ethics and Metaphysics are offered in alternat-
ing years. The purpose of  such seminars is to 
acquaint Bachelor students with the reading 
of  primary texts. The tutors offer an historical 
and thematic introduction to the philosophi-
cal problems at stake in the texts in question, 
while guiding BA students in their reading; they 
coordinate the discussion and presentation of  
the material in question, and finally read and 
evaluate their final papers, providing feedback 
on students’ performance. Moreover, each year, 
in consultation with the titularis of  the seminar, 
the International programme tutors write the 
syllabus for their seminar, choosing the reading 
material and the themes they will develop in 
their teaching, setting out the learning goals of  
the seminar in question. 
All these activities, such as choosing course 
content which is both relevant in the context of  
the programme of  study, and adequate to the 
level of  the students, setting out and communi-
cating to students the educational goals, evalu-
ating and providing feedback, are of  crucial im-
portance for the future academic career of  doc-
toral students in Philosophy. The Centre for 
Educational Development of  the K.U.Leuven 
supports them in planning these activities and 
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in reflecting on teaching practice by offering a 
series of  seminars, organized throughout the 
year. Such seminars deal with topics such as 
what good teaching is, how to ensure active 
participation on the part of  students, and what 
criteria to use in evaluating presentations and 
written work, as well as class participation. The 
seminars take the form of  an open discussion, 
where doctoral students put forward their ideas 
and confront their experiences and teaching 
strategies, responding to issues and questions 
raised by the educational expert, as well as by 
their fellow tutors. The CED experts also offer 
an illustration of  the pedagogical approaches 
favoured by the K.U.Leuven on certain issues, 
and of  the different teaching strategies and 
methods of  evaluation that can be put to work 
in the context of  a seminar. The purpose is to 
encourage tutors’ reflections on these topics in 
education, in order to promote an individual 
approach and a case by case application of  
different approaches, and to facilitate the im-
plementation of  a well-thought out teaching 
method. As a final activity at the end of  the 
teaching experience, the Centre for Educational 
Development also organizes seminars where the 
tutors, after having received the results of  their 
student evaluations, discuss the challenges and 
rewards of  their experience, and formulate ways 
to improve their teaching and to better respond 
to the needs and expectations of  students. The 
purpose is to help doctoral students to take a 
first step in formulating their vision on the best 
practices of  interacting with undergraduate 
students and communicating knowledge in the 
field of  philosophy.
The Faculty of  Philosophy is greatly appre-
ciative of  the contribution of  doctoral students 
in teaching seminars and views their feedback 
as fundamental for ameliorating the education-
al quality of  the BA programme. Hence, it is 
committed to organising every year an internal 
‘debriefing meeting’ where tutors discuss their 
experience and put forward their suggestions 
for changes and improvements.
The HIW is planning to expand its co-
operation with the Centre of  Educational 
Development in offering support for doctoral 
students who are preparing job applications. 
The CED already provides tutors with the 
teaching evaluations sheets, which are necessary 
in many job applications, processing and ana-
lyzing their results. This year, however, they will 
also organize a workshop, open to all doctoral 
students finishing up their studies, on how to 
write a teaching statement. Such a document 
is requested especially in North-American 
job applications, but is becoming increasingly 
relevant also in the European context. This 
will be done in cooperation with the director 
of  the International Programme, Professor 
Russell Friedman. The future plan is to link 
this seminar with the previous meetings of  the 
tutors training programme, where the different 
aspects of  the activity of  teaching, as well as the 
practical concerns of  the tutors, are addressed 
starting from the concrete experience of  those 
doctoral students who are teaching a seminar. 
This would be integrated into a final more the-
oretical moment, where tutors take a broader 
outlook on the meaning of  teaching and educa-
tion, and have the chance to pen a first draft of  
their ‘teaching philosophy’ statement.
This activity is part of  the larger commit-
ment of  the Faculty of  Philosophy in support-
ing the competitiveness of  its doctoral students 
on the international job market. Amongst the 
other initiatives in this direction, this year 
there will take place a seminar on ‘Applying 
for Jobs in Philosophy,’ organised by the cur-
rent and former directors of  the International 
Programme, Professor Russell Friedman and 
Professor William Desmond, together with 
Professor Jan Opsomer. Prof. Opsomer, who 
was hired last year at the HIW , will be the 
HIW’s first “Doctoral Officer.” Doctoral stu-
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dents who have an upcoming job-interview can 
request to have a mock-interview with some 
faculty members with international experience, 
organised in order to better prepare for the real 
one. In addition, a webpage for doctoral stu-
dents is right now under preparation.
Report by Margherita Tonon
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A life in Leuven
Ten stanzas in the style of Hillaire Belloc Proclamation speech by Jonathan Sozek, June 2010
Passing ‘neath the iron gate
of the Higher Institute
one can sense that one has come
into a place of some repute.
And after many months of time
spent contemplating matters learnéd
one can say with certainty
that this repute is well-deservéd.
If you’ll let me, I shall say
why, to me, it seems this way.
Past the archives and salons
and past the lawn and willow tree
and past the secretariat
one comes into the library.
Its collection is superb
(a ‘gem’ as Friedman once intoned)
and creaky stairs and floors ensure
you won’t forget you’re not alone.
These books work with the lectures 
to deepen our conjectures.
The lecturers are thoughtful men,
I’ve studied with a few.
Friedman on the Trinity 
and Desmond’s metaxu;
Visker questions Levinas
and Braeckman reads Arendt,
Vanheeswijk reads Gauchet, and Cloots
asks what religion meant.
Van Brakel’s scientific virtues,
Martin Stone’s Descartes,
Cruysberghs’ anthropology
and Bernet’s course on art; 
Steel with friendship is concerned
and Raymaekers with Kant,
and Geyskens’ talks on Freud reveal
just what we really want. 
Breeur on modernity
and Moors on Kant, again, 
and Burms on intuition – 
truly these are thoughtful men. 
But still these lectures aren’t complete. 
The HIW’s indeed replete 
with more to do and see.
Take the Thursday Lectures, 
and the wine t’which we repair,
(Or the) Card’nal Mercier seminars 
this year with Jonathan Lear.
If student company’s more your thing
then pass some time with IPSA; 
concerts, reading groups, and bread
make for a happy picture.
Just add the Christmas Dinner and
your satisfaction’s ready to hand.
Despite how sometimes it may seem
there is a world beyond the gate,
and out in Leuven city do
diversions and temptations wait.
You can ride your bike to Peeters’;
get a book for thirty euro,
or else hit up a copy shop
(if your income’s close to zero).
A famous Alma dinner pleases
all but the gourmets,
though foreigners all war’ly eye
that tub of mayonnaise.
Later there’s the nightshop;
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you can get a drink and then inspect,
while sitting on Ladeuzeplein,
that strange, impaléd, green insect.
(And) echo’ing off the cobblestones, 
through gray and rain (and sometimes sun),
the sound of bells is hourly heard,
<dun da dun da dun da dun>
Yet perhaps the most distinctive
pleasures of the place
come from sitting in the sun
and talking face to face.
At Erasmus you may find
you’ll want to never leave;
just speak those magic words you know:
een koffie alstublieft.
Or grab a broodje at Commerce,
a coffee at Pangaea,
kebab and frites on every block! 
(Though of those last you’ll tire.)
If a beer you should prefer,
the Oude Markt awaits you,
Leffe, Duval, Rodenbach, though
next morn’ your head may hate you. 
Of course one needs to moderate 
these pleasures of the flesh;
to turn the mind to higher things,
and keep the spirit fresh. 
But life in Leuven: it is good,
flesh and spirit both, 
with each day another chance
for true and lasting growth.
And so these thoughts I here conclude,
lest I should, in time, protrude.
I hope you’ve found them well construed.
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The song of Plato’s Ghost 
Proclamation Speech by William Desmond, June 2010
Esteemed Rector, Colleagues, Students, 
Visitors:
I
It is my honor to greet you and offer congratu-
lations and perhaps some words of  philosophi-
cal edification as Director of  the International 
Programme. The international character of  
this gathering today reflects how the inter-
national dimension of  education has always 
been important at Leuven and at this Institute. 
The language of  instruction is English but 
the homes of  our students extend far beyond 
the English speaking world, to all continents, 
north, south, east, west. Our purpose has always 
been to make the Institute a hospitable place of  
learning and study.  I especially welcome, on 
behalf  of  the International Programme, all the 
family members and guests of  students who 
have traveled from foreign lands to be present 
here today.  
Some of  you students are finishing your 
studies and are either going on to further study 
elsewhere or have chosen to continue here. 
For some of  you today marks a completion, 
and also another beginning as you prepare for 
departure. Though you leave, we still retain an 
interest in your future, and the hope that you 
will remember us and keep in touch. For oth-
ers among you, the end today is only a stage in 
your education and we look forward to seeing 
your bright and refreshed faces in the next aca-
demic year. 
II
“Brevity is the soul of  wit.” This was said 
in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, though it was said 
by someone who was a babbler, a gas bag – 
Polonius. I will be brief.  On a hot day the last 
thing one wants is more warm gas. They say the 
optimal sermon is seven minutes. I think even 
the Vatican has given its imprimatur to this tim-
ing. Seven is a sacred number, but do not time 
me here, for I may sin. Nevertheless I will be 
brief, and if  I sin I hope it will be a venial one. 
The year just finished was one of  comings 
and goings for both students and faculty. A 
new wave of  students came in, now an old wave 
is ebbing out. An old wave of  senior faculty is 
also ebbing, leaving the face of  the Institute 
changed, in this year and years to come. But as 
Crazy Jane, the wild woman of  Yeats’ old im-
agination, said:  “Men come, men go, all things 
remain in God.”
It has been a year of  the predictable and 
the surprising. The predictable: here we are 
again at the end of  another academic year. Of  
course, it is not quite predictable for students 
who are here for the first time. For faculty, it is 
otherwise – we have been here before, some of  
us many times.
Today does mark the completion of  stud-
ies, and it should ritually mark that completion. 
But it is notable that, alas, quite a few have not 
completed their studies and are postponing 
to the autumn session. It is a bit odd to stop 
before the end of  a race and celebrate before 
the race is finished. Man is the not yet finished 
animal, Nietzsche said.  In our midst today, 
there are quite a few unfinished animals.
It has been a year of  the unpredictable also, 
certainly for me anyway. Here I am again – to 
my surprise – a superannuated Director of  the 
International Programme, called back from the 
dead. So dead, many students don’t know, I 
have been here 12 times before. Is this to be like 
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Empedocles? Before he became a god, he was 
driven by strife, by Eris, into exile, and made to 
wander through all the elements – “for already 
I have once been a boy and a girl, a bush and 
a bird and a dumb sea fish.” (Fragment, 117). 
Too true, the Director of  the International 
Programme is not a god, though whether he is 
still a dumb sea fish is still a disputed question. 
In any event, it is a real surprise to be here a 
thirteenth time. I am Lazarus rubbing his eyes. 
Of  course, thirteen is an unlucky number. It is 
also a number of  treachery and betrayal. 
III
What is it to be a philosopher? What fidelities 
define our vocation?  What betrayals? We ques-
tion and question and question. We question 
even about truth. Pilate – What is truth? But he 
did wait for an answer. Richard Rorty smirked 
somewhere that truth is what your colleagues 
let you get away with. We now know that you 
can get away with lots of  things. For quite a 
long time. And that your colleagues, perhaps 
unwittingly, let you get away with it. But what 
you get away with is not always true.
Man is the unfinished animal, perhaps, but 
in the lack of  finish, there is something that 
relentlessly insists on itself  – something with 
which we will never be finished.  Though we 
might not possess the truth, something of  the 
spirit of  truthfulness is insistent in us, and can 
come to possess us. In not possessing the truth, 
we are possessed by the call to be truthful. 
This is a double paradoxical condition: to 
be truthful even when not in possession of  the 
truth. And that doubleness is somehow itself  
true to our middle condition which is to be 
true and in the truth. This condition does not 
let us get away with it.
The counterfeits live from the true, but, it 
is true, we are not always certain of  the differ-
ence. The counterfeit is not worthy of  credit, 
though it claims the credit of  the true. The true 
is worthy of  credit – it is creditworthy. Our 
“being true” comes down to a question of  trust 
– of  the trustworthy. And this comes down to 
what we deem worthy of  ultimate affirmation. 
What do we deem so worthy?
Being truthful bears on our ultimate “yes.” 
There can be something tyrannical about this, 
this insistence. We will never be finished with 
it. Plato tried to distinguish the philosopher 
and the tyrant – and yet there is something 
tyrannical about the spirit of  truth. This insist-
ence insists on nothing but fidelity. But fidelity 
is nothing if  it is not a free consent. Hence this 
is a kind of  benign tyranny. Its insistence is not 
malign. It blesses us – even when we have to 
be truthful about what curses us. If  we betray 
this blessing, what have we left?  More likely a 
malignant tyranny – a curse masquerading as a 
blessing.  
What then, dear students, what then?
IV
The year is at its finish. What do we finish 
here?  “Finish” – of  course, this can mean to 
finish off, that is to kill.  Does the finish kill 
the spirit of  truthfulness? 
I think also of  what used to be called the 
Finishing School.  In the 19th century, the 
Finishing School was an institution for genteel 
ladies. Is it a stretch to think of  the Institute 
as a Finishing School for genteel ladies?  The 
genteel ladies can equally be men, of  course, 
these days, since in our post-phallogocentric 
times, we have transcended such discriminatory 
differences. 
Suppose truth is a woman, suggested the 
hermaphrodite Nietzsche – monstrously mix-
ing Hermes and Aphrodite.  But this lady is not 
always genteel, and sometimes more gypsy than 
domestic – her spirit wanders where it will. No 
“project” will capture her – she must be wooed. 
Have we time now for such wooing? How 
busy we are with our projects. A project is not a 
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matter of  waiting expectantly for an enigmatic 
future. The outcomes are predetermined. We 
are to shape the future in advance in terms of  
what we will it to be. In one respect, to seek to 
shape the future is part of  the temporality of  
human expectation. But there is something to 
the notion of  “pro-ject” which hints that we 
will only accept what comes, if  it does so, on 
the terms we already define in advance. There 
is in pro-jection the temptation to tyranny over 
the surprise of  time. Pro-jection, one worries, 
really wants no surprises. You cannot pro-ject a 
surprise, or indeed a blessing, say, in the form 
of  an uncalculated godsend. Projection is al-
ways already ahead of  itself. A godsend is what 
disrupts the pro-ject of  always already being 
ahead of  oneself.
Projects are very useful, very necessary, but 
sometimes they sin against the readiness for 
surprise. And is this perhaps not part of  philo-
sophical finishing:  readiness for surprise?  For 
there are, of  course, surprising consolations of  
philosophy, as Boethius came to know.  How 
make a project of  being in prison, on the eve 
of  one’s death – the predictable and the abso-
lutely unpredictable both together?  For what 
did Boethius have in his prison? Nothing. No 
project, no funding – and yet there is consola-
tion in the cell in the visitation of  Lady Sophia 
bringing readiness before death – in surprise 
before death – in surprise at death. Finishing is 
beyond all projects. He philosophized beyond 
all projects. Projects (can) conspire to finish 
philosophy. At the finish all that remains is 
being true. 
I return to the Finishing School for genteel 
ladies. Philosophers are not unlike genteel la-
dies – a species not met with too often, I admit. 
Like genteel ladies, philosophers are generally 
rather useless – though perhaps they are rarely 
things of  beauty and adornment. What father 
or mother delights in their strong sons being 
turned into genteel ladies? The corruption 
of  the youth it what it was called in the time 
Socrates – some of  his graduates were not at all 
genteel, or female – though they did mutilate 
the Hermes.
We no longer have genteel ladies – we have 
that goddess of  many shapes – Lady Gaga. 
Lady Gaga – crazy protean goddess of  the 
YouTube video. Sorcereress, enchantress, Circe, 
she has no identity: she is everyone and no-
one.  This is something, by the way, Nietzsche 
almost suggests about himself: all the names in 
history and none of  them.  Does Lady Gaga 
have the idiot wisdom of  Crazy Jane? Does 
she have the spooky transhuman wisdom of  
Sophia?
What then, gentle ladies, what then? 
V
Nietzsche said somewhere that his writings 
call for rumination. They must be chewed and 
regurgitated, and chewed again. One must be a 
kind of  cow. One of  his books (Zarathustra) was 
18 months in gestation, he tells us. Hence he 
wittily described himself  as a female elephant.
I ask again: How many unfinished animals 
are here today? How many pregnant elephant 
cows are here?  Finishing is also being born or 
giving birth – “coming to term,” is one of  the 
English phrases for birth. Normally a human 
gestation lasts about 9 months – around the 
time for a thesis to be conceived or a disser-
tation to be dropped. We should watch out 
for pregnancies beyond term. We risk losing 
the services of  a Socratic midwife to decide 
whether it is a genuine pregnancy or not.
Beyond term, too many students now seem 
to be pushing into elephant territory.  My 
advice would be: Stay true to the human 
scale, the human generation. Do not become 
Nietzschean female elephants.
What then, dear students, what then?
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VI
I finish with a poem which questions the na-
ture of  every finish. It narrates the story from 
school days to success to late in life.  It is writ-
ten by the magnificent William Butler Yeats, 
and is a poem about a man of  letters and his 
successful projects. In it the ghost of  Plato 
appears – appears as tortured by a question, 
and as torturing us with a question. It is called: 
What Then? 
His chosen comrades thought at school
He must grow a famous man;
He thought the same and lived by rule,
All his twenties crammed with toil;
‘What then?’ sang Plato’s ghost. ‘What then?’
 
Everything he wrote was read,
After certain years he won
Sufficient money for his need,
Friends that have been friends indeed;
‘What then?’ sang Plato’s ghost. ‘What then?’
 
All his happier dreams came true – 
A small old house, wife, daughter, son,
Grounds where plum and cabbage grew,
Poets and Wits about him drew;
‘What then?’ sang Plato’s ghost. ‘What then?’
 
‘The work is done,’ grown old he thought,
‘According to my boyish plan;
Let the fools rage, I swerved in naught,
Something to perfection brought’;
But louder sang that ghost,’‘What then?’
What then, dear students?  What then indeed?
VII
But perhaps this is too weighty a question on 
this occasion to wait for an answer, and I repent 
its somber tone. After all, this day here now is 
a time to bless and to count one’s blessings. So 
to finish I change the mood, and pronounce my 
last Ave atque Vale: 
Whether you, dear students, are leaving or 
staying, going or abiding, you are part of  the 
philosophical community that is the Institute. 
Without your curiosity, your conscientious-
ness, your questioning, and new presence, this 
philosophical community would not be what it 
is. For those leaving, you will bring something 
of  Leuven away with you, as we hope we have 
given something of  ourselves to you, and as you 
have undoubtedly left something of  yourself  
here.  
And so, to those who have come to visit, 
welcome; to those successfully completing their 
studies, congratulations; to those who have 
still some ways to go, encouragements; and  to 
all those who are soon to depart, every good 
fortune.  
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mysticism without 
Bounds
International Conference, January 5th – 8th, 2011, Bangalore, India
From January 5th to 8th, 2011, the international con-
ference ‘Mysticism without Bounds’ (MwB2011), was 
jointly organized by Christ University (www.christuni-
versity.in) and Dharmaram Vidya Kshetram (www.dvk.
in), under the aegis of Dharmaram College, Bangalore 
(www.dharmaram.in). The Institute of Philosophy, 
Leuven, was one of the Event Partners of the confer-
ence and sent eight of its professors and researchers to the 
conference. All of them returned home full of impressions 
and interesting stories.
In this issue of the Newsletter, you can read a conference 
report by Fr. Kurian Kachappilly, CMI, convener of 
MwB2011, followed by photographs and stories from some 
of the Leuven participants to the conference.
Conference theme
‘Mysticism’ (from the Greek μυστικός, mys-
tikos) is the pursuit of  communion with, iden-
tity with, or conscious awareness of  an ulti-
mate reality, divinity, spiritual truth, or God, 
through direct experience, intuition or insight. 
‘Mysticism without Bounds’ (MwB2011) was 
an attempt to explore the “mystical con-
sciousness” from different disciplines, like reli-
gions (Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism, Taoism, etc), sciences (biology, new 
physics, neuroscience, and logic), humanities 
(philosophy, theology, spirituality, psychol-
ogy, etc.), and art forms (poetry, music, dance, 
visual arts, rituals, and occultism).
In ‘Mysticism without Bounds’ (MwB2011), 
we tried to explore the inter-disciplinarity as a 
way of  naming the phenomenon of  merg-
ing boundaries that mysticism makes possible 
and concrete. Certain common grounds do 
exist among the various forms of  conscious-
ness, scattered among the world’s religions, 
theologies, sciences, philosophies, and various 
art forms.
•	 In fact, differing religious and theological tradi-
tions have described this fundamental mys-
tical experience in different ways. However, 
at the core of  all the major religions and 
theologies, there exists a current of  mysti-
cal teachings which, when compared to one 
another, exhibit a startling degree of  cross-
cultural agreement.
•	 Sciences and mysticism appear antithetical, 
but we find in mysticism a type of  spir-
ituality which has close epistemological 
parallels to science. Studies in several areas 
of  science address the same issues that 
concern the mystics, and while science, like 
quantum physics, does not ‘prove’ mystical 
teachings, the fundamental reality which it 
describes is not incompatible with the fun-
damental reality testified to by the mystics. 
•	 Various philosophical fields, such as ontology 
(which is concerned with the nature of  
reality), epistemology (which deals with 
the nature, acquisition and limitations of  
knowledge) and phenomenology (which 
insists on the first-person, experiential 
stance that mystics try to achieve) would 
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appear to relate to various aspects of  mys-
tical consciousness, although they have not 
yet been correlated in a systematic way.
•	 Many art forms not only can be ways for 
mystics to communicate what they are 
trying to teach, but they have also helped 
shape the minds and imaginations of  the 
mystics. Poetry, music, dance, visual arts 
and rituals have emerged as fascinating 
ways to connect the undifferentiated states 
of  oneness, non-duality, and the differenti-
ated states of  diversity and multiplicity.
The discovery of  such points of  convergence 
among religions, sciences, philosophies and 
arts on ‘mysticism’ is intellectually very excit-
ing; and it holds out the possibility of  creating 
a new worldview in which these disciplines would 
be seen as distinct yet complementary ways 
of  exploring the same underlying reality. This 
new world view can create an awareness of  the 
essential unity of  humanity, and work for the 
welfare of  all, irrespective of  social, political 
and religious differences.
Participants
The MwB2011 was attended by over 320 del-
egates from thirty countries, like Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Congo, Germany, 
Korea, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines, South 
Africa, Sweden, Thailand, UK and USA. There 
was a large contingent of  28 delegates from 
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. 
There were about 200 Indian delegates from 
different universities, faculties, institutes 
and centres across the Indian Subcontinent. 
There were also representatives from various 
Indian Associations, like ACPI (Association 
of  Christian Philosophers of  India), BAP 
(Bangalore Academy of  Philosophers), KPC 
(Kerala Philosophical Congress), ILAAM 
(Indian Leuven Alumni Association Meeting), 
etc.
About 150 scholarly papers were presented 
in five parallel sessions chaired by delegates, 
participants and invited guests, in addition to 
the key-note papers. Some of  the highlights of  
the MwB2011 include (1) Inauguration by the 
Prior General, Dr. Jose Panthaplamthottiyil, 
(2) Presidential Address by Swami Veda 
Bharati, (3) Key-note papers by Dr. Bernard 
McGinn (USA), Dr. Paul Moyaert (Belgium), 
Dr. Peter Tyler (UK), Dr. Reimund Bieringer 
(Belgium), Dr. Una Agnew (Ireland) and Dr. 
Francis Vineeth (India), (4) Cultural Evening, 
(5) Conference (Gala) Dinner, (6) MwB2011 
Business Session, (7) Release of  Books/
Journals.
As part of  the MwB2011, a Book Fair cum 
Cultural Exhibition was organized, and some of  
the well-known publishers, like Asian Trading 
Corporation, Cambridge University Press, DC 
Books, Dharmaram Publications, Marg, Orient 
Blackswan, Oxford University Press, Viva, etc. 
participated in the Book Fair. In connec-
tion with the MwB2011, the Communication 
Department, Christ University, arranged a 
Photo-Exhibition, in which Sr. Françoise 
Bosteels (Belgium) also took part with a rare 
collection of  dolls, which are used “to retell 
the stories of  Jesus through the stories of  the 
people.” A special volume of  Tattva, Journal of 
Philosophy, consisting of  the keynote papers of  
the MwB2011, was released during the confer-
ence (gala) dinner.
Acknowledgements
On behalf  of  the Organizing Committee, I 
like to place on record my heartfelt thanks 
and appreciation to all the delegates, present-
ers, participants, event partners, who have 
extended their wholehearted support toward 
the successful organization of  the MwB2011, 
especially to all the heads of  the institu-
tions: Prof. Dr. Augustine Thottakara (Rector, 
Dharmaram College), Dr. Thomas C. Mathew 
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(Vice Chancellor, Christ University) and 
Dr. Francis Thonippara (President, DVK); 
Prof. Dr. Lieven Boeve (Dean, Faculty of  
Theology, KUL, Belgium); Prof. Dr. Antoon 
Vandevelde (Dean, Institute of  Philosophy, 
KUL, Belgium); and  Dr. Annette Meuthrath 
(Asia Desk, Institute of  Missiology Missio, 
Aachen, Germany).
Indeed I am happy to notify (in the light of  
the several mails, messages and calls I received) 
that almost all the delegates and participants 
returned to their own respective country/insti-
tution with a heart filled with satisfaction and 
joy, with a mind enlightened and awakened to 
the challenges of  life, and a body refreshed and 
recharged for more action, promising NOT 
to miss the next chance to come together in 
Bangalore to exchange their views and reviews, 
to pool their research activities and findings, 
to share their expertise and experience, on an 
important but meaningful topic/theme for the 
advancement of  knowledge and the promotion 
of  common good.
Paul Cortois, Marlies De Munck, Vincent Caudron 
and Dennis Vanden Auweele, the first one seemingly 
reaching out for help, the other ones studying the map 
after getting totally lost in the labyrinth of narrow 
streets. Only cows remain patient and calm in the middle 
of such a hectic environment with thousands of cars and 
people - reason enough to worship them as holy animals. 
(Stéphane Symons)
Paul Moyaert explaining away after a visit to a local 
church devoted to the Holy Virgin. The mixture of local 
religious practices with christian influences proved to be a 
very fascinating scene for the majority of our colleagues, 
some of whom have even brought home small wooden 
figurines of the local heroes Ganesh, Shiva and Vishnu. 
(Stéphane Symons)
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Stranded on Mahatma Gandhi Road, struggling to stay on one’s feet on the sidewalks of a city 
in rapid economic growth: Bangalore, Mumbai’s little sister, home of Hotmail, a new metropolis 
skyrocketing in the ICT-world. And here we are: Professor Moyaert, a doctoral student of his, and 
I, distractedly scanning the passing crowds for familiar faces. A short but memorable death ride in an 
auto rickshaw—a speedy, manoeuvrable variant of the yellow cab—has just separated us from the 
rest of our party, then dropped us off and finally left us forlorn in this jungle of traffic and general 
chaos, handed over to bewildered contemplation, when suddenly, in front of our searching eyes, two 
camels coolly traverse the arena of cars, motorcycles, trucks and other high-speed projectiles. If God 
created this world as a playtime experiment, his real-time little goose board, India must be its finest 
test case, we marvel… and it works! Flavouring this rat race game as a sort of punctum, the finishing 
touch of His masterwork, a speck of the purest contingency defies its murderous laws of survival: if, 
by any chance, a black-and-white tetrapod happens to stroll by, the universe yields—“Slow down and 
behold, Holy Coincidence is on its way!” Not often do deep insights appear at command, but attend-
ing a conference in India surely allows a tiny glimpse of the mysteries of life. (Marlies De Munck)
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There’s bustle and noise all-over in India: in 
the streets, at the market, on the cricket fields. Even 
at night, it’s hard to fall asleep. This is because local 
inhabitants use their horn to indicate directions, 
instead of the direction indicator. When, around 1-2 
AM, traffic finally calms down, one can start trying 
to get some sleep. But very soon, around 5 AM, I 
learn what multiculturalism in India really means: 
the bells of the nearby catholic church start to ring, 
Muslims are called to their prayers from the local 
Mosque’s minaret, and not far from there, in the 
small Hindu temple, people merrily sound the drums. 
(Dennis Vanden Auweele)
  the leuven philosophy newsletter, volume 18, 2010-2011   65
Doctoral dissertations 
2009-2010 
Danielle Layne – Double Ignorance: An Examination 
of Socratic Moral Wisdom. PhD supervisor: Professor 
Gerd Van Riel; co-supervisor: Professor Carlos 
Steel
While many scholars of  Socratic philosophy 
have discussed the considerable importance of  
Socrates’ profession of  ignorance, most still ne-
glect to discuss the fundamental role ignorance 
plays throughout Plato’s work. To counter this 
deficiency, this project analyzes the Platonic 
dialogues and, in doing so, concludes that at 
least two forms of  ignorance occur in the dia-
logues, and furthermore in a hierarchal relation. 
Notably, Socrates and Plato’s other dominant 
protagonists deride only one of  the forms of  
ignorance, double ignorance, which is the igno-
rance of  ignorance conjoined with the pretense 
to knowledge. This discovery holds a particular 
importance for those interested in solving the 
contradictions inherent in Socrates’ apparent 
commitment in the early dialogues to moral 
intellectualism since this distinction between 
forms of  ignorance evidences that not all kinds 
of  ignorance hinder individuals from obtain-
ing the wisdom constitutive of  human virtue. 
Furthermore, this examination expands the 
particular discussion of  Socratic philosophy to 
include Platonic philosophy in general in order 
to make evident that Plato, throughout his 
dialogues, maintained this distinction between 
forms of  venial and benign ignorance and con-
tinued to regard Socratic or simple ignorance 
to be an indispensable component of  not only 
authentic philosophy but also the good life.
Matthias Lievens - Spectres of the Political. Uncovering 
the Metapolitical in Carl Schmitt. PhD supervisor: 
Professor Toon Braeckman
Carl Schmitt critically diagnosed his era as 
one of  increasing depoliticisation. According 
to him, a crucial feature of  contemporary 
ideologies such as liberalism, cosmopolitan-
ism, philosophies of  progress, or technocratic 
conceptions, is that they do not recognise the 
essence of  ‘the political,’ namely the fact that 
the world is composed of  a plurality of  friends 
and enemies. By concealing the existence of  
conflicts, they tend to make them only worse 
and uncontrollable. Schmitt argued precisely 
for recognising the reality of  conflicts and 
giving them a place. His political philosophy 
should be understood on a metalevel: his is a 
political-philosophical fight for the political, 
i.e. a relation of  reciprocal recognition between 
friend and enemy. 
In this dissertation, it is argued that the 
problematic and undemocratic positions 
Schmitt adopted during his lifetime should 
not be understood in terms of  his concept 
of  ‘the political,’ which is rather interesting 
as it stresses the importance of  recognizing 
the ‘other,’ but in terms of  the way he tries to 
tame its subversive aspects. Schmitt is the first 
author who drew the now current distinction 
between ‘politics,’ i.e. a particular, institution-
alised sphere in society (the state), and ‘the 
political,’ a symbolically produced relation of  
enmity that can pop up at every point in so-
ciety. The aim of  Schmitt’s intervention with 
regard to this fruitful distinction is to restore 
the political monopoly of  the state. In order 
to realise this, he has to radically depoliticise 
non-state spheres. This move is at the basis of  a 
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number of  his most problematic, authoritarian 
visions on the state, democracy and sovereignty. 
Hanne Jacobs - Ego, Monad, Person. Husserl and 
Leibniz on the Identity, Continuity, and Individuality 
of the Subject. PhD supervisor: Professor Rudolf  
Bernet
This dissertation provides an investigation into 
the different senses of  self  and identity as they 
can be discerned from the point of  view of  
Husserl’s phenomenology. From a phenomeno-
logical point of  view, we can describe ourselves 
as subjects in at least three complementary 
ways: as an ego, a monad, and a person. The 
differentiation of  these different senses of  self  
allows for a description of  subjective (dis-)
continuity and (non-)identity at different lev-
els as it corresponds to our lived experience, 
such as the formal identity of  the I (as living 
present), the temporal continuity and interrup-
tion of  our stream of  intentional awareness, 
and forms of  personal continuity and fissure. 
In light of  this differentiation, one can dis-
tinguish between the question of  the continu-
ity of  consciousness and personal continuity. 
While as conscious subjects we are continuous 
through time, as persons we always identify 
more or less with our personal past and past 
projects. That is, to localize one being a person 
in the positions a subject takes, like Husserl 
does, is to think of  personhood as something 
that is the result of  a self-constitution. This 
essentially dynamic character of  the person is 
a reflection of  the way in which the world is 
given to this person as continuously becom-
ing, suffused with changing values, and shot 
through by evolving projects and desires. In 
order to elucidate the originality of  the phe-
nomenological account of  self  and identity, 
this account is contrasted with the Leibnizian 
concept of  monad and individuality as well as 
with the Lockean account of  person, personal 
appropriation, and personal identity.
Gregory De Vleeschouwer - Getekend door het 
lichaam. De rol van het lichaam bij de totstandkoming 
van persoonsidentiteit. (Marked by the body. The role of 
the body in the formation of personal identity.) PhD 
supervisor: Professor Arnold Burms
For the classical tradition, the question of  
what unifies a person throughout his life - the 
question of  personal identity - was easily an-
swered by referring to the soul or immaterial 
substance. The conclusion of  this dissertation 
is that what is responsible for the fact that I 
experience myself  as one person throughout 
time - Locke’s sameness of consciousness - does not 
result from an inner qualitative feeling (chapter 
1), nor from a higher-order deduction (chapter 
2), but from an acquaintance with the fact that 
my body continuously could have been traced 
by equivalent others (who experience my body 
as the manifestation of  one and the same life). 
For this acquaintance, which originates gradu-
ally starting from the age of  nine months (cf. 
the so-called nine-month revolution), one does not 
have to visualize oneself  or to focus on oneself  
- and for that reason the model is formal. 
With my body as sheer corporality, my identi-
ty is given from the beginning. But the acquaintance 
with this givenness, on the other hand, is only 
developed in a social interactive process. This 
can be sketched as a midpoint (corporality) with 
its circle around it: the acquaintance is what we 
call self-consciousness and it can be seen as the 
space between the circle and its midpoint. The 
circle is the resultant of  the interplay between 
the inner and the outer perspective: the inner 
perspective (person, consciousness) and the outer 
perspective evoke one another and keep each 
other in balance - a dynamic balance that es-
tablishes how much I will be conscious of  my 
own body as an object and that thus establishes 
how big my circle of  self-consciousness will be.
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Michela Summa - Archeologia del sensibile. Spazio e 
tempo nella fenomenologia di Edmund Husserl. PhD 
supervisors: Professor Rudolf  Bernet and 
Professor Silvana Borutti (PhD in co-tutela 
with Università degli studi di Pavia) 
In the corpus of  Husserl’s writings, the analyses 
concerning spatial and temporal constitution 
are more often than not kept separate from 
one another. Yet how shall the relation between 
these two dimensions of  lived experience be 
conceived? 
If  we stick to Husserl’s own architecton-
ics of  experience, this relation can firstly be 
described as a foundational one: material and 
spatial constitution, involving transcendent 
perception, are founded on temporal consti-
tution, which can be abstractively considered 
at the level of  pure immanence. Nevertheless, 
even assuming this architectonic account, which 
presupposes Husserl’s theory of  abstraction, 
the question as to the relation between spatial 
and temporal constitution still needs further 
elaboration. Indeed, the temporal and the 
spatial dimensions might be more profoundly 
connected within the complex unity of  lived 
experience, and this intertwining might even 
shed new light on the a priori of  correlation 
between the subject and the world. Husserl 
seems to have this most profound interweaving 
in mind when, in one of  his later manuscripts 
(D 12 IV, 1931), he speaks about the “configura-
tive” unity of  the pre-objective spatio-temporal 
world configuration, which “precedes” the dis-
tinction of  space and time as forms of  sensible 
experience.
The aim of  this study is to better charac-
terize this configurative unity of  spatiality and 
temporality, and to show its reverberation on 
the phenomenology of  sensuous experience. 
The dissertation is divided into two sections. 
The first one investigates Husserl’s theory of  
schlichte Erfahrung, which is progressively devel-
oped into his “transcendental aesthetic” phe-
nomenologically revisited. The second section 
focuses on Husserl’s concrete analyses of  con-
stitution, and sheds light on the topoi that bear 
witness to the profound interweaving of  lived 
spatiality and temporality.
Aaron Schuster - The Trouble with Pleasure. 
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. PhD supervi-
sor: Professor Paul Moyaert; co-supervisor: 
Professor Gerd Van Riel
That human life is propelled by a manifold of  
drives, and that these drives seek, at bottom, to 
gain pleasure and avoid unpleasure is the alpha 
and omega of  Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory. Broadly speaking, psychoanalysis moves 
between two alternative ways of  thinking pleas-
ure. On the one hand, human desire is doomed 
to dissatisfaction and the search for pleasure 
fraught with insurmountable obstacles. On 
the other, psychoanalysis effects an unheard 
extension of  the notion of  pleasure, uncovering 
furtive and unsuspected satisfactions precisely 
where they would seem to be most absent. 
Instead of  satisfaction being impossible to 
attain, the opposite conclusion imposes itself: 
pleasure is impossible to avoid. 
The aim of  this dissertation is to untan-
gle the philosophical history of  thinking on 
pleasure, and to specify the uniqueness of  
psychoanalysis with regard to traditional con-
ceptions of  pleasure. The author begins with 
the seminal definitions advanced by Plato and 
Aristotle: for the former pleasure consists in 
the filling of  a lack; for the latter the enjoy-
ment of  activity. In the case of  Freud, while 
largely holding to a Platonic model (where the 
filling of  a lack is replaced by the discharge 
of  tension), there are passages in his work 
that embrace a more positive, Aristotelian ap-
proach. Examining the different definitions of  
pleasure in the Freudian corpus, the disserta-
tion brings psychoanalysis into dialogue with 
Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Schopenhauer, 
68   the leuven philosophy newsletter, volume 18, 2010-2011
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, as well as the 
Kantian-Schillerian notion of  free aesthetic 
pleasure, and debates in 19th century psychol-
ogy about mental inertia and vitalism. Aaron 
Schuster also discusses the problem of  maso-
chism in Freud’s theory of  pleasure, and takes 
up the most serious contemporary criticism 
of  the psychoanalytic conception of  pleasure, 
formulated by Gilles Deleuze.
Thomas Kochalumchuvattil - Subjectivity and 
Intersubjectivity in Kierkegaard and African Philosophy. 
A Cross-Cultural Approach. PhD supervisor: 
Professor Paul Cruysberghs
This thesis represents an attempt to apply a 
cross-cultural approach to the problems of  
Africa. It is argued that problems such as pov-
erty, HIV/AIDS, ethnic conflict and corrup-
tion stem from the inadequate attention paid 
to the development of  personal subjectivity 
on that continent owing to the communitarian 
ethos which pervades social and cultural rela-
tions. In an effort to remedy this state of  affairs 
the thought of  Søren Kierkegaard in relation 
to subjectivity and intersubjectivity is closely 
examined with a view to its possible application 
in the African context.
In order to do this it is first necessary to 
rebut the criticisms (Buber, Levinas et al.) that 
Kierkegaard’s conception of  subjectivity con-
ceives of  an enclosed individual for whom the 
possibility of  relation to the Other is necessar-
ily forsaken. To the contrary, a careful reading 
of  Kierkegaard’s work reveals a conception of  
subjectivity which permits and even requires a 
double movement from the subjective within to 
the Other, culminating in fulfilment of  the in-
tersubjective command to love one’s neighbour 
as oneself.
Thomas Kochalumchuvattil then under-
takes a study of  African philosophy, which 
confirms that, while African philosophy has 
much to commend it in terms of  connecting 
African people to their communitarian roots 
while breaking the intellectual chains of  co-
lonialism, too little attention has been paid 
to the development of  personal subjectivity. 
Finally, the author demonstrates the kind of  
educational programme that might address the 
issue of  cultivating subjectivity which, while 
remaining true to Kierkegaardian insights, also 
respects African society and culture.
Tom Jacobs - Kritiek van de zuivere Verlichting. Naar 
een dialectiek van de universaliteit. (A critique of pure 
Enlightenment. Towards a dialectics of universality.) 
PhD supervisor: Professor Guy Vanheeswijck; 
co-supervisor: Professor André Cloots
This dissertation is conceived as an inquiry 
into how the Enlightenment repeats itself  
today, independently of  the way in which the 
Enlightenment has become a historical-phe-
nomenal system. Hence the title of  the disserta-
tion: a critique of  pure Enlightenment. The au-
thor investigates how a certain notion of  purity 
undermines the dynamics of  Enlightenment, 
and how accounting for this kind of  critique 
can help revitalize the Enlightenment.
The subtitle shows that the focus lies on 
the theme of  universality. This notion is far 
from being univocal. This is why the critique in 
Jacobs’ dissertation has the form of  a dialectics 
of  universality. Nevertheless, the dissertation 
is neither an analytical study of  the notion of  
universality, nor a clarification of  the concept 
of  dialectics. The author examines the process 
of  development of  the problem of  universality, 
starting from the Enlightenment, and in doing 
so, he distinguishes between four phases: the 
abstract-universal, the concrete-universal, the 
singular-universal and the situational-universal. 
These four phases represent the four chap-
ters of  the dissertation. The first chapter is a 
clarification of  the purpose of  the dissertation, 
using the critique of  Hamann and Milbank on 
the Kantian notion of  universality. The second 
part concerns the way in which Hegel incorpo-
rates the critique of  the contra-Enlightenment 
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in his defense of  concrete universality. Part 
three starts from an alternative tradition in 
the study of  universality: we take a look at 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which opens a 
path that is radicalized in the 20th century by 
Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze. Finally, in 
the fourth chapter, Tom Jacobs makes an at-
tempt to use Badiou’s philosophy of  universal-
ity for an alternative reading of  Kant’s practical 
philosophy.
Arnis Ritups - Aristotle’s De Anima III.6: Essays 
in the history of its interpretation. PhD supervisor: 
Professor Carlos Steel
Aristotle’s  De Anima III.6 is a particularly ob-
scure text – there is no consensus among its 
readers on what the text says and means and it 
is not even clear what the text is about. At the 
same time, various interpretations have singled 
out the 36 lines of  the text as particularly im-
portant for Aristotle’s understanding of  ‘think-
ing’ (noesis). This study opens with a question 
‘why is Aristotle obscure?’ and a survey of  four 
main answers to the question. The rest of  the 
work is dedicated to the four known ancient 
interpretations of De Anima III.6. All four make 
Aristotle’s obscure text coherent and each of  
them tell an (almost) entirely different story. 
Themistius (350 A.D.) has treated the chapter 
as being concerned with delineating specific 
features of  the human intellect. The discussion 
is dominated by the human intellect’s involve-
ment with time and language, although the 
intellect’s peculiar ability to unify whatever it 
thinks plays a significant role as well.
Ammonius (between 480 and 570 A.D.), on 
the other hand, sees the chapter as dedicated 
to distinguishing all kinds of  possible objects 
of  the intellect. For Ammonius the chapter is 
organized hierarchically, starting with linguistic 
terms and ending with immaterial forms and 
the intellect’s way of  thinking them. Although 
Philoponus (one of  Ammonius’ pupils) also 
notes that all kinds of  intelligibles are dis-
cussed by Aristotle in the text, his picture is 
dominated by a distinction between the intel-
lectual understanding and discursive thought. 
Finally, for Pseudo-Simplicius (after 530) the 
chapter is concerned with the thinking of  
forms which are the proper intelligible objects 
of  the soul’s essential intellect. For him the 
chapter can be summarized in one phrase – the 
intellect’s proper objects are the forms and the 
intellect cannot be mistaken in its thinking of  
them.
Adam Gonya - Two Pictures of the Voice: Assertion and 
Receptivity in the Work of Stanley Cavell. PhD super-
visor: Professor William Desmond
Knowing what we want to say, we select the 
words that best express our meaning. At other 
times, however, it seems the words simply 
come. This thesis examines the work of  three 
philosophers - Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
Cavell - under the aspect of  these two poten-
cies with words, assertion and receptivity. The 
question is: how do these two potencies relate 
when we make ourselves intelligible? 
Arthur Schopenhauer provides a trenchant 
endorsement of  the assertive potency (first 
picture of  the voice). Friedrich Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, endorses the energies associated 
with reception (second picture of  the voice). In 
both accounts each picture of  the voice is advo-
cated at the expense of  the other. To find some 
way for them to relate, Adam Gonya turns 
to the American philosopher Stanley Cavell. 
Cavell draws the (assertive) intellect out of  
skeptical isolation by bringing it into relation 
with what is outside its ambit. Yet this is not 
through knowing and appropriation (the prob-
lematic ambition of  the skeptic), but through a 
shift in the preponderance of  the first picture 
of  the voice to that of  the second. Put simply, 
this amounts to taking up a position toward the 
human field of  meaning relying less on control 
and clarity and more on patience, intimation, 
and faith.
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Fiorella Magnano - Il  ‘De topicis differ-
entiis’ di Severino Boezio. PhD supervisors: 
Professor Russell Friedman and Professor 
Giulio  d’Onofrio  (PhD in co-tutela with 
Università degli studi di Salerno)
According to Boethius, the discipline of  the 
topics is the foundational discipline for the 
dialecticians, the rhetoricians, and the phi-
losophers, precisely because it is the only way 
to discover the starting points of  all types of  
argumentation: “topicorum vero intentio est 
verisimilium argumentorum copiam demon-
strare”. Boethius arrives at this view through 
comparing in a particularly ingenious and orig-
inal way the division of  topics descended from 
the Aristotelian and Ciceronian, the Greek and 
the Latin traditions. After having translated 
and commented on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’ and on 
Cicero’s ‘Topics’, Boethius wrote his last logical 
work, i.e. the monograph of  the ‘De topicis 
differentiis’, in which he tried to show the dif-
ferences and similarities between Themistius’s 
and Cicero’s divisions of  the topics, i.e. the 
Greek and the Latin traditions on the topics. 
Fiorella Magnano offers a detailed analysis 
of  this last Boethius’s treatise. Her disserta-
tion is composed of  four chapters in which 
she furnishes a full commentary of  the four 
books of  which the ‘De topicis differentiis’ is 
constituted. In the appendix, she presents the 
Latin text with the Italian translation. Finally, 
in the bibliography, it is possible to find the 
most recent second literature on Boethius with 
a particular section devoted to the ‘De topicis 
differentiis’.
Maimaitiming Aila - Under the Cloak of Anonymity. 
A Pluralistic Approach to the Notion of Anonymity. 
PhD supervisor: Professor William Desmond
Historically, the term anonymity has been 
used in a highly negative way. There are some 
exceptions: the “anonymous donor”, for in-
stance, is the subject of  an act of  pure giving 
without revealing the very source of  this giving. 
Anonymous voting is a way of  ensuring fair-
ness and equality.  However, more frequently, 
anonymity is associated with an inauthentic 
form of  existence pertaining to the mode of  
being “nobody” that signifies lack of  social 
position, power and fame. It is essentially a 
negative marker that poses a threat to the very 
ethics of  our society which rests on individual-
ism, transparency and accountability. 
Generally, anonymity, apart from denoting 
merely the lack of  a name, is an a priori setting, 
a hidden shelter, an intriguing duplicity, and an 
unreachable height. What unites the plethora 
of  phenomena called “anonymous” is the sheer 
manifestation of  equivocity as expressed in an 
absence in presence - or concealment in dis-
closure. 
In his dissertation, Maimaitiming Aila uses 
a pluralistic method of  inquiry to reveal the 
meaning of  anonymity in different fields: 
ontological (the notion of  nothing as unspeak-
able and unnameable), linguistic, literary (the 
problem of  anonymous authorship), ethical 
(anonymity and intersubjectivity) and religious 
(anonymity and transcendence; the theological 
model of  “God the anonymous”). To analyze 
those different meanings, he enters into a dia-
logue with authors such as Barthes, Foucault, 
Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, and Marion.
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news 2009-2010
Personalia:
Four professors became emeriti professors on 
October 1, 2010: Paul Cruysberghs, Carlos 
Steel, Jaap van Brakel, and Ignace Verhack. Rob 
Devos became a special emeritus professor. 
Simultaneously, the Institute of  Philosophy 
welcomed three new professors. Pieter d’Hoine 
was appointed as tenure track lecturer in 
Ancient Philosophy, in succession of  Carlos 
Steel. Jan Opsomer came from Cologne to 
start as a research professor (BOF-ZAP) at 
the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, and Andrea 
Robiglio left Groningen to occupy Martin 
Stone’s position as professor of  late Medieval 
and Renaissance Philosophy.
Gerd Van Riel was promoted to the rank of  full 
professor, starting October 1, 2010. 
Toon Vandevelde received a positive evalua-
tion as Dean of  the Institute of  Philosophy; 
his appointment was therefore renewed until 
2013. At the last Faculty Council meeting of  
the academic year 2009-2010, a new Faculty 
Board was composed, consisting of  the Dean, 
Vice-deans Bart Raymaekers (Education) and 
Stefaan Cuypers (Research), Director of  the 
International Programme Russ Friedman, Gerd 
Van Riel, Toon Braeckman, and Paul Moyaert. 
Assistants and doctoral scholars are represented 
in the Board by Chris Bessemans and Fauve 
Lybaert, students by Stijn De Groof. 
Thursday Lectures and Lectures for the  
XXIst Century:
The Institute offered a richly filled programme 
of  lectures and congresses to its students, staff  
and visitors in 2009-2010, although both the 
Icelandic volcanic ash and personal reasons pre-
vented some guest speakers to travel to Leuven. 
Five Thursday Lectures took place: 
October 9, 2009 – James Harris (University of  
St Andrews), Hume on the Morality of Justice
November 19, 2009  – David Papineau (King’s 
College London), There are no Norms of Belief
December 3, 2009 – Andreas De Block (HIW , 
K.U.Leuven), Is Homosexuality Innate?
February 18, 2010 – Claude Panaccio (Université 
du Québec), Ockham’s Ontology
March 11, 2010 – Robert Stern (University of  
Sheffield), Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, 
Hegel, Kierkegaard
The interdisciplinary course Lectures for the XXIst 
Century (Lessen voor de XXIste eeuw) reached 
its sixteenth edition. Programme 2009-2010:
November 9, 2009 – Bart De Moor, ICT en 
eHealth. Nieuwe wegen voor de wetenschap
November 16, 2009 – Patrick Degryse, Hoe 
geologen de oudheid ontraadselen
November 30, 2009 – Filip Volckaert, De mens 
als evolutionaire knutselaar
December 7, 2009 – Georgi Verbeeck, 60 jaar 
Bondsrepubliek Duitsland
December 14, 2009 – Jeroen Scheerder, De 
opkomst van sportcommunities. Nieuwe organisaties in 
de sport
February 8, 2010 – Rudi Visker, Multiculturele 
verschillen in de publieke ruimte
February 15, 2010 – Reine Meylaerts, Taal, ver-
talen en beleid in de 21ste eeuw
February 22, 2010 – Rudi D’Hooge, Onze hersenen 
en ons gedrag. Moleculaire psychologie en neuroplasticiteit
March 1, 2010 – Philip Joris, Het snelle slakkenhuis. 
Hoe luisteren onze hersenen?
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March 8, 2010 – Daniel Berckmans, Online 
monitoring van levende organismen. Van intensive care tot 
wielrennen en formule 1
March 15, 2010 – Peter De Mey/David Burn, 
Het gesprek tussen theologie en muziek
March 22, 2010 – Johan Swinnen, Economische 
crisis en voedselcrisis
March 29, 2010 – Jan Masschelein, Wat is een 
universiteit? Over de res publica en het publiek maken 
van dingen
Other lectures, congresses and events:
The interdisciplinary doctoral seminar on 
Feminist Theory welcomed Rosi Braidotti as its 
first guest speaker. On November 26, 2009, 
she delivered a lecture at the Institute of  
Philosophy on Immanence after Simone De Beauvoir. 
Resisting Transcendental Masculinity. The lecture was 
followed by a seminar, the next day, on Feminist 
Philosophies of the Subject after Post-Structuralism. 
Two international conferences took place at the 
HIW in December 2009. From December 10 to 
12, History and Philosophy met each other in a 
conference on Historical Epistemology. Participants 
from the Institute of  Philosophy were Paul 
Cortois and Koen Vermeir. At the same time, 
researchers from the Formal Epistemology Project 
organized a conference on New Trends in the Study 
of Implicatures (December 10-11), at which Igor 
Douven was one of  the keynote speakers.  
From January 20-22, 2010, the Institute hosted 
the fourth conference of  the Dutch-Flemish 
Society for Analytic Philosophy. The title of  the 
conference was Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind 
at the Crossroads. Keynote speakers were John 
Campbell and Elizabeth Fricker.
From February 18-20, 2010, the De Wulf-
Mansion Centre organized an international 
conference on Varieties of Cognitive Theory in the 
Later Middle Ages. Towards a Status Quaestionis. 
Marilyn Adams was invited for the Saint Thomas 
Lecture on March 9, 2010. Unfortunately, she 
couldn’t come to Leuven for personal reasons. 
Carlos Steel threw himself  into the breach and 
treated the public to a captivating and instruc-
tive lecture on Is this human body an appropriate organ 
for the rational soul? (Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle).
On March 17, 2010, Yvonne Benschop explained 
why there are no women professors at the HIW 
(and many other things about women in aca-
demia). One day later, the Flemish Psychiatric 
Association and the Philosophy and Society 
Study Group organized a debate on ‘De depressie-
epidemie’ en ‘Het einde van de psychotherapie’: ethische re-
flecties op de psychiatrie. During the year, the Study 
Group also organized public interviews with 
Herman De Dijn and Jean Paul Van Bendegem 
about their recent publications.
The Cardinal Mercier Chair was held by 
Jonathan Lear. His public lecture, on March 
31, was entitled Becoming Human Is Not that Easy. 
Students and staff  were also invited to partici-
pate in two seminars, one on Irony and Identity 
and the other one on Ironic Soul. 
A new event saw the light on April 17, 2010: 
the Philosophy Feast (Feest van de Filosofie). 
More than 250 participants enjoyed a whole 
afternoon and evening of  lectures, debates and 
artistic performances on Thinking and Freedom. 
The annual study day of  the Wijsgerig Gezelschap 
(the Dutch Alumni Association of  the Institute 
of  Philosophy) was also a part of  this event. 
This year’s theme, which was chosen as a trib-
ute to Patricia De Martelaere, was Philosophy and 
Literature.
The month of  May seemed to be a perfect 
moment for congresses: one was hardly finished 
when the next one already followed. On May 
6-7 the conference Art and Morality in Ancient 
Philosophy took place in Leuven and Louvain-
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la-Neuve. At the occasion of  Ignace Verhack 
becoming an emeritus professor, a congress on 
Culture, Education and Christianity was organized 
on May 7-8. Prof. Verhack delivered his valedic-
tory lecture on May 8, entitled How to preserve the 
longing? (Hoe het verlangen te bewaren?). 
In collaboration with the Music and Arts 
Department, the Centre for Culture and 
Philosophy invited Lydia Goehr and Klaus 
Krüger for a lecture on The Contest of the Arts on 
May 11, 2010. The two lectures complemented 
each other and threw light on the rivalry be-
tween the fine arts. On the same day, the bien-
nial Politeia Conference focussed on The Illusion 
of the Achievement of Equality. Guest speakers were 
Saskia Sassen and Richard Sennett.
On May 12, 2010, the founders of  the NFK 
(Nieuwe Filosofische Kring, the Dutch students 
association), J. Debroux and P. Michielsens, to-
gether with Herman De Dijn, Urbain Dhondt, 
Toon Vandevelde and Sam Ijsseling, looked 
back over 40 years of  student life at the 
Institute of  Philosophy. This ‘causerie’ was 
followed by a reception and dinner, while the 
Salons of  the Institute hosted an exhibition on 
the stirring history of  NFK.
On May 14, 2010, students of  the International 
Programme organized an international con-
ference on The Emergence of the Idea of God in the 
History of Phenomenology. Keynote speakers were 
Thomas Vongehr and Bruce Benson. 
The second Summer School in Philosophy, 
from August 23-26, 2010, was a big success. 
40 enthusiastic participants came looking for 
intellectual refreshment, guided by Kant’s fa-
mous questions “What can I know?”, “What 
ought I to do?”, “What can I hope for?” and 
“What is man?” 
The Human Evolution and Behaviour Network 
(HEBeN) held its annual workshop at the 
HIW on September 9-10, 2010. Talks were 
given, among others, by Helen De Cruz, 
Yannick Joye and Jan Willem Lindemans. 
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Financial assistance 
at the institute of 
Philosophy
Institute of Philosophy Doctoral 
Scholarships 
Every year, the Institute of  Philosophy offers 
two to six one-year scholarships (FLOF schol-
arships):
1) two to four one-year doctoral scholarships 
Description: The first aim of  these positions 
is to start a doctoral research project, under 
the guidance of  a professor of  the Institute 
of  Philosophy. During this year, candidates 
must apply for an FWO or BOF grant to 
obtain funding for the remaining years of  the 
doctoral project. Qualifications: MPhil or MA 
Philosophy degree (and another MA degree), 
or dossier that can be evaluated as equivalent.
Application: Candidates need to apply elec-
tronically. With their application they should 
attach a research project for which they use 
the form for application to the doctoral pro-
gramme. Candidates who have already been 
accepted into the doctoral programme may 
submit their application to the doctoral pro-
gramme. See http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/
eng/jobsscholarships.html for deadlines and 
more information.
2) one or two one-year doctoral scholarships for doctoral 
students who are at an advanced stage of their research 
Description: This scholarship is aimed at 
students who have almost finished their 
research project and who will be accepted for 
defense of  their dissertation within 10 months. 
Qualifications: Candidates must have fulfilled 
all doctoral programme requirements
(progress reports, etc.) 
Application: Candidates should apply elec-
tronically, attaching a letter from their pro-
moter confirming that the doctoral project 
is in advanced stage (a table of  contents and 
overview of  the parts that have already been 
written should be included) and guaranteeing 
that the defense will take place during the aca-
demic year. 
See http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/
jobsscholarships.html for deadlines and more 
information.
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral 
Scholarships
Description: The University awards spe-
cial doctoral student grants for advanced 
K.U.Leuven doctoral students (BOF-BDM). 
Qualifications: Applicants must have gradu-
ated at least four years prior to the formal sub-
mission date and may not have received research 
funding enabling them to prepare a doctorate. 
The candidates should however have done 
some research at the K.U.Leuven Association 
on short-term applied or policy-oriented proj-
ects allowing them to get a doctoral degree 
within a period of  one to two years as from 
the official granting date of  the scholarship. 
Number: Depends on the availability of  funds 
for a particular year.
Stipend: The doctoral student receives a doc-
toral scholarship at the level of  a scientific 
assistant, with adjusted seniority.  Tenure: One 
year, once renewable (as a half-time position). 
Application: Applications include the candi-
date’s curriculum vitae, a scientific bibliogra-
phy, a description of  the research project, of  
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the work plan and of  previous research activi-
ties and a letter from the academic supervisor 
covering comments on the project and the 
candidate, an explanation of  why no alternative 
financing is available, clarification regarding the 
feasibility of  the completion of  the doctorate 
within two years and confirmation that the 
doctorate will indeed be completed in time. 
The deadline is in January each year.
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-
Doctoral Scholarships
Short postdoctoral positions for K.U.Leuven doctoral stu-
dents (bof-pdm-short term).
Description: These full-time research man-
dates are explicitly aimed at providing young 
researchers with the opportunity to expand 
their research activities at K.U.Leuven. High 
quality scientific research will be stimulated. 
When granted a PDM mandate, candidates are 
expected to submit an application for an FWO 
post-doctoral grant prior to the next deadline. 
Stipend: Salary is at the level of  doctor-assis-
tant with adjusted seniority. Tenure: one year. 
Application deadline: March 17th.
Long postdoctoral positions for non-K.U.Leuven postdoc-
toral researchers (bof-pdm-long term).
Description: These full-time research man-
dates are explicitly intended to attract young 
and excellent, non-K.U.Leuven postdoctoral 
researchers. They may not have been related 
to K.U.Leuven as a researcher in a period of  
at least 3 years before the date of  submis-
sion of  the pre-application. The profile must 
be of  that kind that the candidate is able to 
acquire a research professorship (BOFZAP) or 
another appointment as tenure track.  Stipend: 
Salary is at the level of  doctor-assistant with 
adjusted seniority. Tenure: maximum 2 years. 
Application: There is no specific submission 
date. A continuous submission is possible.
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-
Doctoral Fellowships 
Description: The University awards post-
doctoral fellowships for senior research-
ers who obtained their doctoral degree at 
a non-K.U.Leuven university (BOF-SF). 
Qualifications: Candidates must have publi-
cally defended their doctoral thesis at least 
8 years before the official submission date, 
must be invited by a University faculty and be 
nominated by a professor of  the University. 
As a general rule, the fellows should bring in 
a new contribution, in the shape of  knowledge 
and expertise that is lacking or insufficiently 
developed and possibly strengthened in the 
applicant’s research group.
Number: Depends on availability of  funds 
for a particular year. Stipend: A grant, a salary 
or a reimbursement of  expenses is determined 
in accordance with the level of  the fellow 
and the percentage of  stipend in the fellow’s 
own institution. Tenure: Up to one academic 
year depending on the length of  the research 
project. Exceptionally renewable. Application: 
Application forms must be filled out and 
submitted by a professor of  the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven together with the curricu-
lum vitae of  the candidate and a brief  descrip-
tion of  the proposed research. Submission 
dates: January and March.
K.U.Leuven Development Cooperation 
Scholarships 
Description: These scholarships are avail-
able to students from developing countries 
(former Soviet Union countries and Eastern 
European countries are not included). They 
are available for candidates wishing to study 
in the Doctoral Programme. Qualifications: 
The applicant must be a citizen of  a develop-
ing country, holder of  a master’s degree with 
excellent academic qualifications, and 35 years 
of  age or younger. Women are encouraged to 
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apply. Further information on qualifications is 
available on the website http://www. kuleuven.
be/iro/ or at the International Office of  the 
university. Number: around 15 scholarships per 
academic year. Stipend: The stipend includes 
full tuition, health insurance coverage, plus an 
additional stipend of  1300 Euros per month. 
Tenure: Up to 4 years. Application: Online 
Application Forms are available on the website: 
http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/. Applications 
must be received no later than January 1st.
FWO PhD Scholarships
Description: scholarship for preparing a PhD 
(FWO-aspirant). Qualifications: Applicants 
need to be a European citizen or need to have 
a Master’s degree from a European university. 
They also need to have been admitted to 
the doctoral programme. The Master’s degree 
must have been obtained no more than 5 years 
before the start date of  the fellowship. Stipend: 
Grant equal to 100% of  the net amount of  
an assistant’s salary. Tenure: The scholarship 
initially starts for 2 years and can be extended 
for another 2 years. Application: Applications 
are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: 
http://www.fwo.be.
FWO Post-Doctoral Scholarships
Description: research scholarship at postdoc-
toral level. Qualifications: All nationalities 
can apply. Candidates must have defended 
their Ph.D. not more than 3 years ago (this 
time limit is postponed by one year in case of  
pregnancy or parental leave and does not apply 
to candidates who have not yet reached the age 
of  36). Tenure: 3 years, renewable. Application: 
Applications are accepted until February 1st. 
FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.
Fulbright Fellowships and Grants
Description: A variety of  fellowships and 
grants are available through the Fulbright 
Commission for study and travel in Belgium. 
Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s 
and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate 
work. There are also teaching and research 
fellowships available for scholars. See http://
www.fulbrightalumni.org/olc/pub/FBA/
cpages/gfn/grants.jsp for more information .
The Belgian-American Educational 
Foundation Fellowships
Descriptions: The Belgian American 
Educational Foundation (BAEF) encourages 
applications for fellowships for advanced study 
or research. Fellowships are offered to American 
students, who wish to study in Belgium, and to 
Belgian students, who wish to study in the 
US. Please see http://www.baef.be for more 
information.
The Flemish Community Fellowships 
Description: These fellowships are offered 
to students at a variety of  levels who wish 
to spend a year or more at a university in the 
Flemish Community. Qualifications: Varies 
from country to country. Application: In the 
United States, applications are available from 
the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW , 
Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 
301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your 
own Ministry of  Education.
United States Veterans Training Benefits 
Description: The Bachelors, Masters, and 
Doctoral Programmes at the Institute of  
Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans 
Administration for awards for qualified US 
veterans and their dependents. Qualification, 
Stipend and Tenure: Determined by the US 
Veterans Administration. Application: Write to 
the US Veterans Administration, Department 
of  Veterans Benefits, Washington DC, 20420.
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United States and Canadian Government 
Student Loans 
Description: The Institute of  Philosophy, 
K.U.Leuven is an approved school within 
the US and Canadian Government Student 
Loans Programmes. US and Canadian stu-
dents may apply for a student loan through 
the K.U.Leuven. Qualifications: Applicants 
must be US or Canadian citizens. Number: 
Unlimited. Stipend: The amount of  the loan 
depends on the amount requested by the stu-
dent and the limits set by the respective gov-
ernments. Tenure: One academic year (loans 
must be repaid when the student has completed 
his/her education). Application: Applications 
are available in the United States through the 
Financial Aid Office at your home campus 
or through a bank. The school code number 
for US applicants is 006671. The section on 
the form to be completed by the school or 
institution can be sent to the following address 
once the section to be filled in by the student 
is complete: Edmund Guzman, International 
Admissions and Mobility Unit, Naamsestraat 
63 - bus 5410, 3000 Leuven. Tel. 32- (0)16-32-37-
64; Fax. 32-(0)16-32-37-73.
SOROS Foundation Scholarships 
Description: Scholarships for exceptional 
Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced stud-
ies at an approved university. Qualification: 
Approval by the selection committee in 
Budapest. Number: Approximately 8 per year. 
Stipend: 675 Euros per month. Tenure: One 
academic year. Application: http://www.soros.
hu/
ERASMUS Programme 
The Erasmus exchange programme gives EU 
students the opportunity to study abroad for 
one semester or for an entire academic year. 
Within the framework of  bilateral exchange 
agreements, students may choose a university 
in a fellow EU country, and have the courses 
they follow abroad taken up in their Leuven 
study curriculum. The Institute of  Philosophy 
currently has exchange agreements with the 
philosophy departments of  the following 
universities: Bulgaria: Bulgarian Academy of  
Sciences Institute for Philosophical Research; 
Germany: Universität Bayreuth (Philosophy 
& Economics), Albert Ludwigs Universität 
Freiburg (Philosophische Fakultät) Universität 
zu Köln (Philosophische Fakultät - Thomas-
Institut), Bergische Universität Wuppertal 
(Philosophische Seminar), Bayerische Julius-
Maximilians-Universität Würzburg (Insitut für 
Philosophie); Finland: University of  Helsinki 
(Dept of  Philosophy, Fac. of  Social Sciences); 
France: Université Lille III - Charles De Gaulle 
(Département de Philosophie), Université Paris 
X - Nanterre (Département de philosophie), 
Hungary: Károli Gáspár University of  the 
Reformed Church (Budapest), Eötvös-Lorand 
University Budapest (Dept of  Philosophy); 
Ireland: University College Dublin (Dept of  
Philosophy), National University of  Ireland 
(Maynooth Dept of  Philosophy), Italy: 
Università degli Studi di Milano (Facoltà di 
Lettere e filosofia), Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore Milano (Facoltà di Lettere e 
filosofia), Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele 
(Milano - Facoltà di Filosofia), Università degli 
Studi di Napoli Frederico II  (Dipartimento 
di Filosofia), Università degli Studi di Padova 
(Dipartimento di filosofia), Università degli 
Studi di Pavia (Facoltà di Lettere e filoso-
fia), Università di Pisa (Dipartimento di 
filosofia), Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia 
(Dipartimento di filosofia), Università di Siena 
(Dipartimento di filosofia); The Netherlands: 
Universiteit Leiden (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte), 
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (Faculteit 
der Filosofie); Poland: Catholic University 
of  Lublin (Faculty of  Philosophy), Maria 
Curie-Sklodowska University (Lublin - Faculty 
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of  Philosophy and Sociology), University of  
Warszaw Institute of  Philosophy; Portugal: 
Unversidade da Beira Interior (Covilhã), 
University of  Lisbon (Departamento de 
Filosofia); Spain: Universidad autonoma de 
Madrid (Departamento de Filosofia); Czech 
Republic: Charles University Prague (Univerzita 
Karlova v Praze - Faculty of  Philosophy 
and Arts); Turkey: Ankara Üniversitesi; 
United Kingdom:  The Queen’s University 
of  Belfast (School of  Philosophical Studies); 
University of  London (Heythrop College); 
Sweden: University of  Linköping (Fac. of  
Arts and Sciences); Switzerland: Universität 
Basel, Universität Bern, Université de Fribourg 
(Département de Philosophie), Université de 
Lausanne (Département de Philosophie)
The Erasmus coordinator of  the HIW is Prof. 
André Cloots.
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